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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter I will include (1) identification of the research problem; 
(2) a discussion of the significance of the research problem; and (3) the 
contributions of the thesis to the study of interorganizational rela­
tions. 
The Research Problem 
There is a need for greater understanding of the antecedents of in­
tegration in interorganizational networks. Integration has been studied 
on the societal level (Durkheim, 1933), in communities (Angell, 1951; 
1968), and within individual organizational systems (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967). Only recently has it been introduced to the study of interorgan­
izational systems (Metcalfe, 1976). 
TT'JO types nf inrpgration. normative and funcLioual, stem directly 
fron a societal-level theory of social solidarity developed by Emile 
Durkheim in The Division of Labor. The direct counterparts to these 
concepts on the interorganizational level of analysis are domain con­
sensus and interdependence. Domain consensus refers to shared defini­
tions of responsibilities between organizations; interdependence refers 
to patterns of collaborative activity been organizations. The general 
objective of this dissertation is to examine the relationship between 
domain consensus and interdependence, and to relate these two types of 
integration to comparative properties of organizational dyads. 
The model of integration developed here is a simple one, but one 
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that has received very little empirical attention (Angell, 1968). It 
is an elaboration of the general proposition that similarity is asso­
ciated with normative integration, and that differences are associated 
with functional integration (Durkheim, 1933; Hawley, 1950). Normative 
integration is based on common values which unite the members of a 
social system and functional integration derives from interrelated ac­
tivities and needs. An important question is how each type of integra­
tion operates in interorganizational systems, and to what extent the 
proposition generalizes across different units of analysis. 
Two major approaches to the study of interorganizational relations 
are the comparative and the relational (Marrett, 1971). The compara­
tive approach focuses on the similarities or differences of interacting 
organizations on certain attributes or dimensions. This approach should 
not be confused with the comparative study of organizations, which re­
fers to studies cf large numbers of organizations (yermw. 1961). 
The relational approach focuses on the linkages between organiza­
tions. These properties reflect interaction between organizations, and 
include domain consensus and interdependence. A number of writers have 
suggested that domain consensus and interdependence (relational proper­
ties) are related to the comparative properties of the interacting 
organizations (Miller, 1958; Raid, 1969; Marrett, 1971). This study 
examines comparative properties as determinants of relational properties 
within organizational dyads, with the understanding that integration is 
reflected in the character of relations between elements of a system. 
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Importance of studyinR interorsanizational relations 
The study of interorganizational systems has received greater 
attention in recent years. Coleman (1972) describes the importance of 
organizations as actors in a society and the extensive power they wield 
in contrast to individuals as actors. The structure of ielationships 
among collective actors is an emergent phenomenon of modem society and 
part of the process of rationalization that Weber (1947) termed 
Vergesellschaft. This process is reflected in the tendency for the 
web of governmental units to become increasingly interconnected under 
norms of administrative efficiency and comprehensive service. The ad­
vance of bureaucratic interconnectedness has created networks of greater 
scope than ever before thought possible. The networks have grown faster 
than the ability of individual members of a society to understand the 
complex influences exerted by these sets of collective actors. A similar 
phenomenon is occurring in the private sector, as demonstrated by the 
rise of complex financial and ownership arrangements associated with 
conglomerates in this country, and the global reach of multinational 
corporations. Benson (1975) has noted that interorganizational networks 
are a basic feature of modem society. 
The focus of this study is on relationships among county-level 
government agencies responsible for managing natural resources. The dy­
namics and implications of the activities of local interorganizational 
networks may not be as dramatic as those on the state or federal levels, 
but the magnitude and value of resources these agencies oversee on a 
day-to-day basis makes the value of studying and understanding their 
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activities as important as the other levels. 
Several interrelated forces have tended to encourage integration 
among the activities of natural resource management agencies. The en­
vironmental movement has heightened concern for protecting natural re­
sources by promoting a canprehensive view of natural systems and human 
activity (Morrison et al., 1972). New environmental legislation, particu­
larly NEPA, has tended to expand existing interagency activity, and to 
create new linkages where none before existed (O'Riordan, 1976). In­
creasingly, Interagency networks are seen as important mechanisms for 
protecting and managing a dwindling supply of natural resources. 
It is important to study networks of resource managers because of 
the need to understand which factors lead to effective linkages between 
organizations, and to identify the outccmes of these linkages. Ogle 
(1972) described some of the situational factors that led to effective 
interagency working relationships among a network of resource agencies 
which included similarities and differences. The comparative properties 
of organizations that comprise a network may be important factors that 
impede or facilitate interorganizational activity. Many environmental 
problems exceed the scope of any one particular agency's responsibility, 
requiring a coordinated response by a number of interrelated groups. 
The research problem is to understand the deterrainancs of integra­
tion among agencies that manage natural resources. Are regularities in 
the structure of relationships among agencies in the network associated 
with the characteristics of the organizations that compose the network? 
Normative integration is the degree to which the standards of a 
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group constitute effective norms for the behavior of its members 
(Landecker, 1951). Among organizations, normative integration is man­
ifested in consensus over organizational domain. Domain consensus is 
manifested in congruence between specific expectations of organization 
set members and the intentions of a focal organization (Metcalfe, 1976). 
Some of these expectations may be culturally based, and hence include 
some aspects of cultural integration. Domain consensus is directly 
analogous to role consensus within a small group, and cultural and role 
expectations may be similarly intermingled. Some expectations for a 
role occupant stem from the role itself and others from her membership 
in a particular culture or society. 
Functional integration refers to the exchange of services among 
members of a group, as well as a division of labor among members 
(Landecker, 1951). As the process of arranging transactions and coordi-
ILaLJ-Llg Lctatvb xiivoi.vco vumiLii.il. L, a v/ii. ^  u .i. v tv ^ ^  ^ *-
treated as a part of functional integration in this study. Functional 
integration is reflected in interdependence and deliberate coordination 
of the sometimes disparate activities of the members of an organization 
set (Metcalfe, 1976:339). 
In the study of interorganizational relations, integration has been 
examined as a key outcome variable, particularly the degree to which 
relationships are cooperative, are coordinated, and involve the sharing 
or exchange of resources (Rogers and Molnar, 1975; l-Jhite, 1974b). A 
central focus of the interorganizational relations literature has been 
the identification of factors that determine the occurrence, intensity, 
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and character of an organization's relations with other groups. 
The study of integration in interorganizational relations focuses 
on properties of the relationships between organizations, particularly 
in reference to a limited set or network of organizations that defines 
the pattern of relationships to be considered. This study examines two 
types of integration, domain consensus and interdependence, in relation­
ships between resource management agencies. 
Units of analysis in interorganizational theory 
The unit of analysis in the study of interorganizational relations 
varies widely. Units employed at the interorganizational level are the 
interorganizational field, the organization set or network, and the 
organizational dyad. A conmon unifying thread to this literature is the 
view of organizations as open systems as "systems within systems" 
(Haas and Drabek, 1973:85), or as "complexes of elements standing in 
interaction" (von Bertalanffy, 1968:33). 
The most inclusive unit of analysis to date is called the inter­
organizational field (Warren, 1967; Rogers, 1974b). Warren views the 
interorganizational field as a structured situation in which the various 
organizations interact in such a way that their mutual influence tends 
to exceed the borders of the units involved. The configuration or net­
work of organizations may present a variable context for the existence 
and activity of other organizations in the field (Emery and Trist, 1965; 
Turk, 1973). 
A related, but more narrowly delimited unit of analysis is the 
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concept of organization set (Evan, 1965; 1966). An organization set is 
defined in terms of the network of interactions maintained by a single 
"focal organization" with other organizations in its environment; a group 
of organizations that share each other's presence in a ccmmon task en­
vironment. Evan (1965) suggests that organization sets may vary among 
different types of organizations under varying environmental conditions. 
The properties of the set also may have consequences for a given focal 
organization as a contextual variable representing the character of the 
organizational environment (Coleman, 1960; Emery and Trist, 1965). 
Interorganizational fields and organization sets represent configur­
ations of linkages among organizations. An intermediate system lying 
between the organization set and the individual organization is the 
organizational dyad or pair of organizations. The dyad is the nexus of 
interorganizational interaction. A central concern of interorganiza­
tional theory and research is the level and kind of linkage between two 
organizations. Simmel (1956:122) notes; 
the simplest sociological formation, methodologically speak­
ing, remains that which operates between two elements. It 
contains the scheme, germ, and material of innumerable more 
ccmplex forms. . . . Not only are many general forms of 
sociation realised in it in a very pure and characteristic 
fashion; what is more, the limitation to two members Is a 
condition under which alone several forms of relationship 
exist . . . occasionally these forms exist as much between 
two groups - families, states, and organizations of various 
kinds - as between two individuals. 
The organizational dyad offers several advantages as a focus for 
investigation. First, the dyad is the most central interorganizational 
unit of analysis. Cooperation, conflict, exchange, and domain consensus 
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are directly manifested and observed in bilateral relations between or­
ganizations. Larger systems of interaction may be operative, but re­
source flows and communication occur in elemental form between indi­
vidual organizations, two at a time. 
Second, because network properties are derived in most part from 
relations between organizations, dyadic analysis permits the examination 
of emergent properties of the group in relation to the interaction 
properties of individual dyads (Blau, 1960). Frequently dyadic linkages 
are aggregated to obtain field or set properties, such as clique struc­
ture and measures of cohesion and integration (Kemper, 1972; Rogers, 
1974b). Aggregated dyadic properties may be variable properties of net­
works, and can be employed as contextual variables. 
Third, the dyad permits the analysis of purely relational proper­
ties of organizations in conjunction with comparative properties of dy­
adic cuiipoueiiLb. The similarity, complementarity, cr congruence of 
organizations may in large part determine the nature of relations between 
them. The present study will more fully explore the implications asso­
ciated with the third advantage of the dyad in the study of interorgani-
zational relations. 
The number of previous studies that examined organizational dyads 
is limited (Benson, 1975; Aldrich, 1974; Warren, 1974). None of the 
reviewe i studies examined the comparative properties of dyads and their 
consequences for interdependence or demain consensus in interorganina­
tional relationships. 
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Public and private organizations 
Several writers have detailed the importance of differences be­
tween business firms and public agencies (Downs, 1967; Wamsley and 
Zald, 1973; Parsons, 1974; Molnar and Rogers, 1976). These differences 
argue for separate conceptualizations of the dynamics of public and pri­
vate organizations. Each type presents a distinct context for theoriz­
ing and analysis. 
Meyer (1975) identifies three consequences of neglecting the sys­
tematic differences between bureaus and firms. First, overgeneraliza-
tion is associated with the extension of concepts from one organiza­
tional type to another that may possess wholly different purposes. 
Second, specialized forms of organizational behavior are associated 
with each type, reflecting dissimilar internal environments. Finally, 
certain questions of public policy rest on this distinction, particularly 
wiLli Lesycct to whether certain scrviccs are best provided by the pvblif 
or private sectors (Wamsley and Zald, 1973; Rushing, 1974). 
Differences between public and private sectors are clearly mani­
fested in the dynamics of organizational domains. Business firms gener­
ally operate under unstable and competitive domain conditions. Bureaus 
operate with a relatively fixed clientele, where once established, con­
tinued existence and growth is all but assured. Public organizations 
attempt to carve out a relatively unoccupied domain in the totality of 
policy space (Downs, 1967:313). Unlike private organizations, bureau­
cratic domains are most vulnerable to change through the political 
process, particularly budget decisions, legislation, and executive order. 
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Private and public organizations each use characteristic methods 
to build environmental support for their domains. Private organizations 
use strategies such as advertising, technological innovation, and other 
means to build demand for their products and services. Public organi­
zations, in contrast, acquire additional support in exchange for policy 
commitments to constituencies, by identifying their activities with im­
portant values held by client-support groups, and by building the pres­
tige of the agency (Wildavsky, 1964; Perrow, 1961). 
A differential climate for interorganizational relations exists with­
in the public and private sectors. Relations between private organiza­
tions are supposed to operate under a competitive, free-market ethos. 
Too much contact between organizations is viewed as deleterious to the 
marketplace, and antitrust laws exist to regulate this activity. Public 
organizations operate under norms of administrative efficiency and con-
-^ r> r» »» /-y *- /"> r- -t ^  *•<-« fs 1 m v-, -T  ^  ^
duplication and to deliver better, more comprehensive services. Inter-
oreanizational relations are encouraged, and in many cases, mandated. 
Noting these contextual differences between public and private 
organizations, this study considers only relations among public agen­
cies. Domain consensus and interdependence are important concepts in 
the study of business organizations, but must be considered in light of 
a different" set of operating assumptions and interpretations that will 
not be discussed here. 
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Significance of the Problem 
The concept of integration is a potential starting point for the de­
velopment of a comprehensive theory of interorganizational relations. 
Two key aspects of relations among goal-oriented collectivities are 
domain consensus and interdependence (Levine and White, 1961; Benson, 
1975). Domain consensus reflects normative integration among organiza­
tions and is an important factor in explaining the outcomes of inter­
organizational systems. It is manifested in attributions of responsi­
bility and probable action held by outside groups that are congruent 
with an organization's own claims and intentions. Domain consensus is 
an important guide for ordering the actions of participants in an inter­
organizational system. 
Interdependence reflects the functional integration of an interorgan­
izational network, as well as the structure of relations among organiza­
tions, which enables a network to operate as an effective unit. Ex­
changes of resources are associated with higher levels of commitment to 
relationships and the establishment of stable linkages among the ele­
ments of a network. 
IiiLègraLiou is a significant means for predicting and understanding 
interorganizational activity. An integrated network presents a context 
in which interorganizational activity is more likely to occur and obtain 
desired outcomes. Very little empirical research has been directed to 
the study of integration in interorganizational systems (Metcalfe, 1976). 
Integration is of practical significance to decision-makers who must 
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relate the activities of their organizations to other groups, which are 
part of the larger system in which they operate. Many substantive 
problems exceed the scope of any single agency's responsibilities; some 
problems are not clearly defined as lying within any single agency's 
jurisdiction. Networks integrated by well-established working relations 
among organizations may more readily respond to complex problems by de­
fining responsibilities and evolving comprehensive interorganizational 
responses. 
Some resource management problems represent societal dilemmas or 
matters of state or national policy that are not resolvable at the local 
level. A subset of natural resource problems are definable within the 
scope of the activities of local resource management networks. The 
underlying significance of the research problem is the need for greater 
knowledge of the mechanisms that enable groups of agencies to function 
as networks. The pLo'ulcm, therefore involves idsntifyins t'np structural 
conditions that countervene effective interagency working relations and 
responses to locally definable resource management problems. 
Contributions of the Study 
The study is considered to make seven contributions. First, it 
will review and interrelate previous conceptualizations of social inte­
gration, particularly normative and functional integration and their 
analogues on the interorganizational level of analysis, domain consensus 
and interdependence, and will attempt to clarify the different inter­
pretations regarding the relationship between these two concepts. 
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Second, the empirical measures utilized in this research reflect 
greater specification of the concepts. Previous studies of domain con­
sensus have been based on single item indicators (Braito, Paulson, and 
Klonglan, 1972; Vacin, 1972), No studies were found that used a multiple 
indicator approach. Most previous studies of interdependence among 
organizations have focused on a single aspect of interorganizational 
relations. This study will employ empirically derived summary indices 
of sets of indicators, developed through canonical correlation analysis. 
Third, the organizational dyad has not been extensively employed 
as a unit of analysis in the study of interorganizational relations. 
Few studies have examined comparative properties in organizational dyads. 
This study focuses on the consequences of comparative properties for 
interorganizational relations. 
Fourth, the methodological approach of canonical correlation is a 
technique only recently introduced to sod olngi cnl analysis. It in a 
means for summarizing the relationship between theoretically meaningful 
sets of variables, permitting inferences to be drawn about the relation­
ship between the abstract concepts represented by each set of variables. 
Fifth, the research strategy undertaken, that of correlating sets 
of relational variables to sets of comparative attribute variables in 
organizational dyads, is unique to this study. Psychological research 
has examined the relationship between sets of attitudinal variables and 
sets of behavioral variables, and studies conducted by political 
scientists have examined attribute variables and relational properties 
in international relations. To the writer's knowledge, no research has 
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examined relationships between sets of attribute and relational vari­
ables in the context of interorganizational relations. 
Sixth, a multivariate approach enables the combined assessment of 
the various categories of comparative properties to determine their 
aggregated contributions in explaining domain consensus and interdepend­
ence variables. No studies were found that related these variables to 
comparative organizational properties of interorganizational dyads. 
Finally, the validity and usefulness of composites formed in canon­
ical analysis will be assessed. The potential advantages and limitations 
of the technique will be summarized and recommendations will be made for 
future utilization of canonical correlation in sociological research. 
Research Objectives 
The objectives of this study are: 
1) To develop the cor.c-c.pt cf social integration, linking it to domain 
consensus and interdependence in organizational dyads, and to relate 
these concepts to comparative organizational properties. The com­
parative organizational properties are: organizational output; 
output constituency; organizational decision-making; and decision­
maker characteristics. 
2) To develop specific sets of indicators for each type of integration 
and the four sets of comparative organizational properties. 
3) To determine the relationship between domain consensus and inter­
dependence, and the relationship between each type of integration 
and the four sets of comparative organizational property variables. 
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4) To examine the overall relationship between composite comparative 
property variables and composite domain consensus and interdepend­
ence variables. 
5) To assess the validity and usefulness of canonical correlation as 
a research procedure. 
Organization of effort 
The theoretical orientation of this thesis will be developed in 
Chapter II. Theory and research on complex organizations and interorgan-
izational relations, exchange theory, and social integration theory will 
be discussed and integrated. The concepts used in the study will be 
stated and hypotheses derived. 
Chapter III will describe the methods and procedures used in the 
present research. The sample and data collection procedures will be de­
scribed, and the empirical hypotheses presented. In addition, the 
measures and analysis strategy will be discussed in this chapter. 
The empirical findings will be presented and the hypotheses evalu­
ated in Chapter IV. The major findings and implications of the study 
will be discussed in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL ORIENTATION 
Introduction 
The purposes of this chapter are to develop a framework for ana­
lyzing two properties of interorganizational relationships, to identify 
major dimensions for comparing organizations, and to derive hypotheses 
that link relational and comparative properties. The chapter begins by 
introducing social integration theory as a context for studying inter­
organizational networks. Open system and exchange perspectives will be 
used to explain relationships within interorganizational networks. Hy­
potheses will be derived to link relational properties of organizational 
dyads to comparative properties of the dyads. 
Complex organization defined 
Bertrand (1972:45) identities a complex organisai:ion as a large-
scale social system whose parts are functionally related in terms of a 
common goal. Similarly, Parsons (1956:69) uses the primacy of orienta­
tion to the attainment of a specific goal as a defining characteristic 
that distinguishes an organization from other types of social systems. 
In this study, complex organization refers to a social unit oriented 
to the realization of specfic goals (Etzioni, 1975:111). Other terms 
that refer to the same class of phenomena are "formal organization", 
"large-scale organization", and "bureaucratic organization" (Blau and 
Scott, 1962:4). 
A complex organization is distinguished from other units of social 
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organization by its internal relations of authority and its orientation 
to a specified goal or purpose. A small group is not an organization 
because it does not contain formal authority relations. A community is 
not organized for the attainment of a specific goal. A complex organiza­
tion, then, is a unique unit of social organization. 
Social Integration Theory 
Two basic theories of social integration are part of the sociologi­
cal analysis of collectivities. These two explanations about how social 
organizations achieve and maintain unity are the normative and func­
tional integration perspectives (Olsen, 1968:159). Angell (1968:382) 
refers to these perspectives as the "common orientation" and "interde­
pendence" theories, respectively. Both have been directed to^^ard ex­
plaining the cohesiveness of elements in a social system. 
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tion is Durkheira's The Division of Labor. Durkheim (1933) argued that 
mechanical solidarity characterized primitive communal societies, while 
organic solidarity is associated with the increasing differentiation of 
modern societies and greater interdependence among specialized parts. 
He foresaw an evolutionary replacement of mechanical by organic solidar­
ity in the development of modern society, but he later modified his 
approach to allow for the concurrent operation of the two processes. 
Many contemporary theorists argue that both normative and functional 
integration occur together as complementary processes because even coop­
eration based on common values requires a simple division of labor 
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(Kemper, 1972:742). 
Normative integration 
Common values and the homogeneity of individuals in a society are 
the basic elements of normative integration. A unit of social organiza­
tion is normatively integrated to the degree that it has developed an 
adequate and internally consistent set of norms (Olsen, 1968:160). 
Normative integration grows out of likeness or homogeneity among ele­
ments. It also is called common value integration because its bonds are 
the shared orientation and outlooks of participants. The basic affinity 
that occurs among elements is explained in terms of their similar char­
acteristics and traits. 
Normative integration is central to the operation of a social sys­
tem (Parsons, 1960). It is associated with norms that apply to persons 
in general, to collectivities, and to structured roles within collectiv­
ities and begins with the accumulation of norms through repeated inter­
action. Previous interactions provide the context for new interactions 
in which adjustment and reinterpretation of expectations take place; 
these new expectations are the starting point for further interaction 
(Turner, 1974). Parscnc (1960) calls this structure-building process 
"institutionalization". 
One of the most important sets of norms associated with organiza­
tions as collectivities are those pertaining to their regular activities 
and concerns, or domain. The process of establishing domain is the 
process of institutionalizing the set of norms associated with the 
organization's activities in a larger system. 
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Normative integration in a network of organizations is indicated 
by the level of consensus on norms regarding domain. Domain consensus 
represents agreement on an important subset of norms that govern the 
way organizations carry out their activities and their relationships 
with other groups. These ideas will be further developed in the discus­
sion of open systems theory. 
Functional integration 
Functional integration is the degree to which there is mutual inter­
dependence among the units of a collectivity (Landecker, 1951). It de­
velops as complementary relationships among specialized and interdependent 
subparts and established and maintained through unified coordination 
(Olsen, 1968:161). Durkheim (1933) argued that as the number and com­
plexity of different elements of a society increases, the web of inter­
dependence among the parts increases. Reliable linkages among the ele­
ments permits further specialization, increasing the dependence of parts, 
one to the other, and the integration of the whole. Interdependence 
is the bonding process of functional integration. 
The elements of a system may be interdependent; they also may 
possess mechanisms for insulating their activities from one another. 
The tendency for subparts to resist subordination and full specializa­
tion is called functional autoncmy (Gouldner, 1959:110). A system may 
never become wholly unified because it must balance the integrative forces 
with the separate and stable charar eristics of its subparts. The drive 
of the subparts to maintain and extsnd their functional autonomy 
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moderates the level of integration that occurs in the larger whole. Con­
cerns for functional autonomy also limit the level of specialization a 
subpart is willing to undergo. 
Specialization encourages complementary dependence among parts, 
for the specialized needs of one unit must correspond to the specialized 
outputs of other units. Exchange theory appears to offer a mechanism 
for explaining interdependence and specifying when it occurs and how it 
is maintained. Interdependence alone, however, does not fully account 
for the operation of exchange processes. Normative structures provide 
the starting mechanisms for the exchange processes, and control their 
continued operation (Parsons, 1960). 
The argument for the simultaneous operation of normative and func­
tional integration is based on the notion of trust. Individuals must 
have some basis for engaging in initial exchanges. Normative mechanisms 
provide a zGans for entering into exchange relations thst grp not- iimmedi-
ately rewarding, as well as a basis for participating in exchange systems 
where returns are indirect or delayed. The norm of reciprocity has been 
cited as a mechanism that provides the minimal grounds necessary for 
confidence and a willingness to initiate action (Gouldner, 1960). 
Exchange Theory 
Exchange theorists have viewed organizations as systems of inter­
action (Barnard, 1938; Ï-Hiyte, 1948; Homans, 1950), and have proceeded 
on the premise that organizational systems can best be studied by ana­
lyzing the interactions among members. Similarly, studies of 
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interorganizational systems have focused on transactions among organiza­
tions (Levine and White, 1961; Adamek and Lavin, 1975; Rogers, 1974a; 
Molnar and Rogers, 1976). 
Exchange theorists do not agree on the central aspects of the mean­
ing and consequences of exchange relations. A major division in this 
perspective occurs between those emphasizing individualistic interpreta­
tions of exchange relations, and those who focus on collectivistic or 
structural interpretations of exchange relations (Ekah, 1974). 
Some theorists have attempted to incorporate elements from both 
perspectives in explaining relations within and among collectivities 
(Blau, 1964; Coleman; 1964; 1966). Each recognizes interdependence as 
a key factor in maintaining group structure. 
Collectivistic exchange 
The idea that exchanges reinforce and integrate group structure 
was underscored in the work of Claude Levi-Strauss (1969:138): He 
stressed "it is the exchange which counts and not the things exchanged," 
For Levi-Strauss, the overriding importance of exchange lies in its con­
sequences for the integration of group structure. 
The collectivistic interpretation of reciprocity goes beyond the 
impulsion to return a benefit received. The obligation extends to 
benefiting another actor implicated in the exchange situation, i.e., A 
gives to C after receiving from B. An exchange relationship also may 
have implications for more than one individual or group of individuals, 
i.e.. Actor A offers a benefit to the group BCD under the expectation 
that C will offer a similar benefit to the group ABD when A is a member. 
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Ekah (1974:55) states that these pooling or redistributive exchanges 
operate according to the law of extended credit. In a generalized ex­
change situation, the receipt of a benefit by one party is regarded as 
a benefit by all other parties and reciprocation is regarded as a credit 
by all of them. 
Durkheim (1933) employed the concept of generalized exchange in 
focusing on functional integration in societies. Increasing interde­
pendence enabled elements to specialize and become differentiated. In 
this perspective, social exchange processes generate integrative forces 
that provide a foundation for further specialization, and in turn, in­
creasing interdependence. Interdependence implies that individuals 
share common sentiments of duty and responsibility, and provides con­
fidence that some tasks will be performed by others. Generalized ex­
change and interdependence are the central mechanisms of functional 
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The important contribution and emphasis of the collectivistic 
tradition in exchange theory is the residual over-arching bonds that are 
generated and renewed by individual transactions in an exchange system. 
Exchange processes emerge from patterns of social integration, and they 
also create and promote further integration through their reoccurrence. 
The collectivistic view of exchange thus argues that the instrumental 
value of the items exchanged is secondary to the integrative forces re­
newed and generated by the occurrence of exchange relations. 
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Individualistic approach 
Theorists who take an individualistic approach to exchange relations 
tend to view society as a body of individuals that does not have an 
existence or emergent properties of its own. This viewpoint stresses 
the utilitarian, hedonistic orientation of actors in a social exchange 
situation. The most prominent individualistic exchange theorist is 
George C. Romans. 
Romans and Schneider (1955) offered a critique and strong reaction 
to generalized exchange. They explicitly rejected the notions of in­
direct, generalized exchange, and focused on limited and direct ex­
changes among people engaged in face-to-face interaction. The authors 
state "We may call this an individual self-interest theory, if we re­
member that interests may be other than economic" (1955:15). 
Arguing specifically for an emphasis on observable properties of 
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Durkheim's assertion that society was an entity sui generis and that 
sociology was not a corollary of psychology" (1961:11). 
There are many theoretical, conceptual, and logical difficulties 
embedded in Honans' arguments, as Turner (1974) and Ekah (1974) have 
ably pointed out. The critical aspect of Romans' image of society, 
however, is the linkage between institutional arrangements and the im­
portance of pay-offs for individuals. Romans' principles deny the effec­
tiveness of generalized exchange systems and the intrinsic rewards de­
rived from participating in them. 
Rcsnans' limited and direct exchange refers mainly to individual-
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level processes, and was not Intended to encompass interaction between 
organizational entities or larger systems (Levine and White, 1961:599). 
Romans' theory is suggestive for larger systems, however, and the im­
portance of both perspectives has been recognized by contemporary 
theorists attempting to described exchange processes among larger units 
of analysis. 
Synthesis 
Peter Blau's (1964) attempt to combine individualistic and collec-
tivistic exchange theories largely emphasized the individualistic as­
pects of exchange (Ekah, 1974). Blau (1964) introduced collectivistic 
aspects of exchange relations in the notion of unspecified obligations 
of social exchange, differentiating social from economic exchange. The 
unstipulated returns for a favor received are recognized as distinct 
fron the direct and limited exchange espoused by Homans. Blau, however, 
gives little credence to Gouldner's (1960) norm of reciprocity, stating 
that the fundamental starting mechanisms of patterned social interaction 
are found in the existential conditions of exchange (1964:192). 
The notions of collectivistic exchange are represented in Blau's 
idea that social uorms substitute indirect exchange for direct trans­
actions between individuals (1964:259). Exchange transactions between 
the collectivity and individual members also replace some of the trans­
actions between individuals. While he recognizes the importance of 
duration in exchange relations, a collectivistic position, Blau continues 
to emphasize self-interest motives as the basic mechanisms of social 
exchange. 
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Coleman (1964; 1966) presents a set of ideas regarding exchange re­
lations within a collectivity, extending the exchange structuralism 
alluded to by Blau. Coleman bases his theory on the assumption that 
actors have a large set of votes on actions of varying interest to them. 
Through continued interaction, actors are able to barter their prefer­
ences on matters of various levels of interest to them. Rational actors 
pursuing selfish interests will delay and alter the expression of pref­
erences on items of lesser utility, in expectations of outcomes on matters 
of greater utility. In reference to legislative activity this process 
is termed "logrolling". 
The medium of exchange in Coleman's system is essentially power over 
actions, which include activity, interaction, and sentiments, a step 
higher in abstraction than Hcsmans'. Coleman argues that the emergent 
properties of exchange systems are generated by observations of the long-
socialized to norms insofar as they learn the relative distribution of 
outcomes associated with various actions. 
Coleman locates the structural source of collective action in the 
generalized belief that compromising of interests will continue to occur 
in the future. Ongoing collective decisions are attributed to the con­
tinuity of rational self-interest in the actions of participating ele­
ments. 
Generalized exchange systems contribute to group Integration by giv­
ing participants a stake in the ongoing set of relationships, investing 
their continued cooperation for similar returns from other group members 
26 
in the future. Distributive justice norms define the long-run expecta­
tions of participants and the kind of costs they may be expected to 
bear. It is the ongoing structure of exchanges, however, that creates 
and enhances the integration of a larger group or collectivity. 
Generalized exchange is a central operating mechanism of integra­
tion, extending the implications of exchange relations beyond the imme­
diate participants. In larger systems of interaction, not all members 
can engage in exchange transactions with all members on a continuous 
basis because of the number and complexity of relations involved. Some 
elements may exchange on an infrequent basis; others may be only in­
directly linked. However, the knowledge that others enter into exchange 
relations when necessary, and are potentially capable of contributing 
their efforts when called upon to do so, is the integrating force of 
generalized exchange. A limited structure of interdependence may be 
Lue bâsis for more intensive and ccmplctc tics zzong group members or. an 
occasional basis. Generalized exchange extends the effects of interde­
pendence beyond the limited and direct benefits to immediate participants 
in transactions to the larger group or collectivity that could poten­
tially benefit from similar exchanges. 
Exchange process also operates in collectivities composed of organ­
izations. The next section brings direct and generalized exchange prin­
ciples to bear on some of the specific processes of interdependence 
among organizations. 
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Exchange and interorganizational relations 
Exchange has been frequently employed as an underlying dynamic or 
inferred motive in relations between organizations (White, 1974b). 
Aiken and Hage (1968:912) observe that most studies of organizational 
interdependence essentially conceive of the organization as an entity 
that needs inputs and provides outputs, both of which link it to other 
organizations via the mechanisms of exchange transactions. 
Exchange principles provide an explanation about how decision­
makers evaluate the investment of organizational resources in relation­
ships with other groups. The concepts of costs, benefits, and reciproc­
ity have proven useful in accounting for interorganizational decisions 
(White, 1974a). 
Levine and White (1961) developed one of the first exchange models 
of relations between organizations and defined exchange as: 
any voluntary activity between tuo organizations "hich has 
consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realization of 
their respective goals and objectives (1961:586). 
They specifically noted that current definitions of exchange are limited 
because they are economic and their referents are mainly individual or 
psychological phenomena not intended to encompass the interaction be­
tween organizations (Levine and White, 1961:586). They also broadened 
the time dimension for gratification beyond that of the immediate present 
and allowed for duration and continuity in exchange relationships. 
Klonglan et al. (1972) described some major theoretical assumptions 
about exchange in interorganizational relations. They argued that pre­
vious studies assumed: 
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(1) Organizations are faced with a situation of limited re­
sources. 
(2) Organizations must obtain resources from other units in 
the task environment. 
(3) Drawing on outside resources reduces an organization's 
autonomy. 
(4) Organizations prefer autonomy and engage in interaction 
only when resource needs cannot be met within the unit. 
These assumptions are consistent with White's (1974a) observation 
that decision-making about control and allocation of resources in an 
interorganizational environment was a dimension ccanmon to all interorgan-
izational research. Decisions on resource investment are directly re­
lated to the type and intensity of interaction between groups because 
time, staff, and facilities are the stuff of interorganizational rela­
tions. Decisions to interact are decisions to allocate these resources, 
and others, to a relationship (Rogers, 1974a). 
A central concern in the study of interorganizational relations has 
been the search for factors that determine the level and kind of inter­
action between organizations. Emphasis has been placed on the need for 
organizations to achieve unity at a larger level of analysis, particu­
larly in the delivery of health and other human services. Exchange 
relations and interdependence are one set of processes for achieving 
the desired linkages. Schermerhorn (1975) identifies three sources of 
incentive propelling organizations to seek relations with outside groups 
that may include exchange transactions. These are: imperative direc­
tion, system norms, and resource needs. 
Relations between organizations may be imperatively directed when 
a powerful extraorganizational force demands this activity. Warren 
(1974) identifies this situation as an inclusive context for 
29 
decision-making, where a supraorganizational authority structure deter­
mines and governs interdependence. 
The importance placed on interaction by other members of an inter­
organizational network may be a motivating force to interorganizational 
relations. When organizations subscribe to a common set of perceptions 
about the importance of interorganizational relations, these shared ex­
pectations may increase the permeability of organizational boundaries 
and facilitate interaction (Evan, 1966; Baker and O'Brien, 1971). The 
permeability of organizational boundaries has been studied in terms of 
the orientation of boundary personnel to interorganizational activity 
(Rogers and Molnar, 1976), 
A third motivating condition for interorganizational relations is 
the need to secure and maintain reliable resources. Organizations shar­
ing a COTomon task environment beccme interdependent to extend their 
existing ailocaLiuLis àud to obtain rescurccs or outccnes otherwise un­
available if they were to act alone. Interdependence may be one solu­
tion to the dilemma of how to make resources stretch to meet increasing 
needs (Black and Kase, 1963:27). 
Interdependence Interdependence is defined as the extent to 
which the elements of an organizational dyad are linked by mutual re­
source commitments involving information exchange, resource exchange, 
and joint programs. Interdependence, or exchange relations among organ­
ization set members, is used to represent the functional integration of 
interorganizational networks. Exchange relations link the elements of 
a system in common or interrelated activities. At the simplest level. 
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functional integration involves the exchange of information between 
elements of a unit of social organization. On the interorganizational 
level, functional integration will be studied in terms of the organiza­
tional concept of interdependence. 
Aiken and Hage (1968) employed the concept of interdependence to 
focus on the problem of interorganizational relations. They recognize 
a sequence of increasing commitment to an interorganizational relation­
ship. Rogers (1974) has empirically demonstrated the incremental nature 
of resource investment in interorganizational relationships. Contact 
among boundary personnel is a less enduring form of relationship than 
exchange of resources, which may indicate some expectation of continuity 
or duration in a relationship. Aiken and Hage (1968) argue that joint 
programming is the most binding form of interdependence between organ­
izations. 
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groups of organizations. Hage (1975) maintains that creating interde­
pendence among organizations is a productive means for increasing the 
effectiveness of interorganizational service delivery systems. Bringing 
agencies together to share a new source of funding was associated with 
improvements in the level and kind o^ joint activity among the agencies 
he studied. 
Interdependence also links organizations to larger systems through 
the processes of generalized exchange. Not all interorganizational re­
lationships require the same level of interdependence, and some groups 
may be linked only indirectly. Indirect and nonreciprocated exchange 
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transactions tie individual organizations to the larger network through 
the knowledge that other groups received subsequent benefits from these 
exchanges, and that similar relationships will occur in the future. The 
interdependencies that do occur also assure other groups that trans­
actions can and will occur in an orderly manner, and that interdepend­
ence can develop when the need arises. 
Generalized exchange may be a particularly important aspect of 
interdependence within networks of public agencies that are involved in 
related aspects of a ccmmon substantive area. Public service norms may 
facilitate the initiation of exchange relations and their maintenance 
over time. Agencies may also be drawn into relationships when failures 
to do so are publicly visible. Nonreciprocal or unequal exchanges may 
be justified or accepted on the basis of contributions to the common 
good, or simply as a means for resolving a commonly shared substantive 
problem. Public service norms, therefore, coupled with the ties of ex­
change relations, may be important factors contributing to the integra­
tion of interorganizational networks. 
This section has reviewed definitions and assumptions associated 
with exchange between organizations. Some of the mechanisms that give 
rise to exchange relations within interorganizational networks were 
examined. An attempt to enlarge the generally limited treatment of ex­
change theory in interorganizational relations was made by discussing 
interorganizational networks as generalized exchange systems. 
By definition, exchange relations further the goal attainment of 
interacting organizations; they also increase the integration of the 
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interorganizational network by generating and maintaining a structure 
of interdependence that unites the larger system. 
The next section brings some of the formulations of systems theory 
to bear on the problem of integration in interorganizational networks. 
Open Systems Theory 
This section introduces interorganizational relations as the study 
of relations between organizational systems. The general problem of 
intersystem relations will be reviewed and the concept of domain intro­
duced in terms of organizational boundaries. Finally, the relationship 
between domain consensus and interdependence will be discussed. 
Complex organizations as open systems 
The sociological interpretation of systems theory is best stated 
by Walter Buckley (1967, 1968); The central focus of systems theory is 
on the principles of organization, regardless of what it is that is 
organized (Buckley, 1968:36). 
Thompson (1967:6) views complex organizations as sets of interde­
pendent parts that matce up unified wholes. Systems analysis emphasizes 
the continuous variation in specificity, ambiguity, and perceived 
legitimacy of normative systems and views organizations as interacting 
with environmental sectors, rather than as mere reactors (Haas and Drabek, 
1973:85). Systems theory is concerned with problems of relationshipsj 
of structure, and of interdependence, rather than the constant attributes 
of objects (Katz and Kahn, 1966:18). 
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An organization is an open system because of its dependencies on 
outside groups; it cannot survive in isolation. Through environmental 
interaction, organizations acquire information and feedback in response 
to their actions, increasing order and organization in response to 
environmental conditions. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) documented the 
effect of environmental conditions in generating organizational struc­
ture. Interorganizational contacts have been found to be an important 
determinant of the role performance of top administrators (Rogers and 
Molnar, 1976). 
A major idea in systems theory is that organizations have boundaries 
that differentiate them from the environment (Aldrich, 1971:283). The 
boundary of an organization is characterized as the area where a lower 
interchange of energy and information occurs than in the system proper 
(Katz and Kahn, 1966:62). Boundaries define which set or pattern of 
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aries may fluctuate situationally, but their dynamic nature nevertheless 
reflects a central tendency over time. 
The phenomena and problems of interorganizational relations are 
part of the general class of boundary-relations problems that confront 
all types of social systems, including complex organizations (Evan, 1966: 
174). Thompson (1967) views relations between organizations primarily 
in terms of contacts between boundary personnel who provide the bridge 
or nexus between organizations. Guetzkow (1966) notes the importance of 
boundary roles for handling relations between organizations. 
Organizational boundaries have been employed by some theorists in 
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a somewhat restricted manner, similar to the "front door" of the organ­
ization. The notion of boundary of interest here is that broader notion 
of limit which differentiates the activity of a particular organization 
from the activities of other groups in the environment. The term domain 
has come to be associated with this broader meaning of differentiation 
in organization-environment relations. 
Domain Levine and White (1961) define domain as the specific 
goals an organization wishes to pursue and the functions it seeks to 
undertake in order to achieve these goals. In addition, organizational 
domains are often viewed as boundaries that define environmental rela­
tions between organizations; they are the normal performance ranges of 
organizational systems when considered in relation to other operating 
systems. Domain often is measured in terms of the population served, 
the technology employed, and the services rendered by an organization 
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tion's locus in the interorganizational field, including its manifest 
goals and its channels of access to task and maintenance resources= 
This study follows Levine and White, defining domain as the goals and 
functions an organization claims as properly its own. 
The kind of services offered is one central criterion for distin­
guishing domains within a given substantive area (Levine and White, 
1961). Some hospitals may treat infectious diseases; others may not. 
Sane natural resource organizations may offer cost-sharing assistance; 
others may not. 
The kinds of clients that cemprise an organization's input and 
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receive its outputs represent another dimension of domain (Levine and 
White, 1961). Client characteristics may differentiate organizational 
dcsnains, as a children's hospital is distinguished from a veteran's 
hospital. Some natural resource organizations deal predominantly with 
farmers, others may serve only sportsmen. 
Domain provides an image of an organization's role in a larger sys­
tem and serves as a guide for ordering action in certain directions and 
not in others (Thompson, 1967:29). Definitions of organizational domain 
are particularly important for organizations that make decisions based 
in part upon their expectations about what other organizations will or 
will not do in response to their actions (Levine and White, 1961:597). 
Domain consensus 
In this study, domain consensus refers to the existence of congruent 
expectations regarding mutual roles and responsibilities between the 
elements of an organizational dyad. Previous writers have defined con­
sensus as the degree of agreement among members about the norms and 
values of a social system (Price, 1972; Tagiuri, 1965). These defini­
tions emphasize normative consensus, i.e., agreement about what should 
be (Weirath, 1976:5). 
Metcalfe (1976) argues that normative integration is reflected in 
the conformity of a focal organization's behavior with expectations held 
by other members of the organization set. Normative integration for an 
organizational dyad is reflected in the degree of consensus about each 
other's claims to domain. 
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Domain consensus is important for understanding how organizations 
work together. Consensus is manifested in conduct governed by beliefs, 
in situations in which conflict would occur or be of greater intensity, 
but for the existence of consensus (Shills, 1975:135). Domain consensus 
is one aspect of the normative integration of an interorganizational 
system. Norms about domain refer to the clients an organization should 
properly servie, the services it can legitimately offer, and the kinds 
of activities it should regularly engage in. 
The distribution of beliefs about organizational demain forms a 
social structure, the parameters of which guide and order the actions 
of the several organizations which hold and maintain these images of 
group responsibility and perogative (Blau, 1974). Thus domain consensus 
permits the allocation of responsibility within an interorganizational 
network. 
The importance of danain consensus tor interorganizational rela­
tions underlies Warren's (1974:22) assertion that in interaction with 
other organizations, an organization acts to preserve or expand its 
demain, in anticipation of similar orientations on the part of other 
organizations. Domain consensus is an outcome of processes by which 
organizations achieve legitimation of their responsibilities and peroga-
tives vis a vis other groups. It serves to protect and insulate organ­
izations from encroaching on or interfering in each other's activities. 
As it is established over time, it facilitates new allocations of func­
tion and responsibility (Warren, 1974). 
When deviations in mutual conceptions of role and responsibility 
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do occur, they may be a source of conflict in interorganizational sys­
tems (Goldman, 1966; Walton, 1972). Basic consensus on performance obli­
gations is important for public agencies, although networks can operate 
quite effectively when there are limited differences of opinion (Etzioni, 
1961:133). Domain consensus will be measured with the understanding 
that a low level of consensus represents high dissensus, and the poten­
tial for specific conflicts to occur in the relationship. 
Domain consensus and interdependence 
Two alternative interpretations of the relationship between domain 
consensus and interdependence can be found in the literature. One argues 
that domain consensus is an antecedent condition of interdependence. 
The other, that domain consensus is coextensive with interdependence. 
Levine and White (1961) regard domain consensus as a prerequisite 
to exchange relations^ the developmental processes of interdependence. 
The flow of elements between organizational systems requires an initial 
definition of roles and responsibilities between the interacting groups 
to provide order to their interrelated activities. A stable system of 
exchange requires an £ priori settlement of the alternative ways of de­
fining the rights and obligations of participants (Parsons, 1951:70; 
Thompson, 1967). 
Haurek and Clark (1967) found that positive evaluation and assess­
ments of legitimacy were important determinants of successful interorgan­
izational transactions. Several studies suggest that consensus on oper­
ating philosophies produces cooperative relations (Miller, 1958; Form 
and Nosow, 1958; Holiister, 1970, and Braito et al., 1972). In 
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addition, others have found domain consensus to be associated with 
cooperative work relationships (Benson, 1975; Aldrich, 1976). 
A second interpretation of domain consensus is that it is a contin­
ually elaborated outcome of ongoing relationships. A sounding-out 
process occurs between organizations attempting to establish a new re­
lationship or alter an old one (Thompson and McEwan, 1958). Each organ­
ization must estimate the position of the other, and its willingness to 
redefine the relationship. The sounding-out process establishes the 
initial level of domain consensus in a relationship, and continues to 
operate in maintaining and elaborating mutually-held understandings re­
garding domain. Thus domain consensus is partly an outcome of the pat­
tern of interaction that emerges. 
A set of shared standards concerning the propriety of each organ­
ization's activities is more likely to emerge through the process of 
interaction. A minimum level of consensus is probably necessary for the 
initial success of a relationship, while continuing contacts between 
parties increases the number of areas in which expectations are estab­
lished (Hunt, 1968). Domain consensus is more usefully conceptualized 
as a continually elaborated outcome of interaction between groups, where 
dqnain issues emerge, are clarified, and resolved. 
Sequences of resolving decisions regarding the conditions of ex­
change and the responsibilities accruing to each party may produce a 
broader degree of domain consensus as mutual understanding and awareness 
increases (Goldman, 1966). Continued organizational interaction broadens 
the base of domain topics on which consensus exists, accumulating 
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structure and stability in the relationship. Continued relations be­
tween groups introduces redundancy, and consequently reliability, into 
the interorganizational linkage (Landau, 1969). 
Roland Warren (1974) reported a strong positive relationship between 
domain consensus and cooperative interaction among the community deci­
sion organizations in the study. Warren argued that such interaction 
is at least a precondition of exchange. Domain consensus was found to 
be positively related to exchange relations in Vacin's (1972) study of 
rural development organizations. 
Both of the above interpretations identify the importance of domain 
consensus as an initial condition for exchange relations. In addition 
to being an antecedent of exchange relations, domain consensus is a 
continually reaffirmed and adjusted outcome of interdependence between 
organizations. 
Finally, interdependence may develop on the basis of calculated 
mutual advantage in the absence of domain consensus (Benson, 1975). 
Interdependence may then produce a tendency to demain consensus once 
activities are underway. In addition some networks may display high 
levels of interdependence despite low domain consensus because laws or 
formal regulationc prescribe the interaction. 
On the basis of this discussion, the first general hypothesis may be 
stated as follows: 
G.H. 1: The relational property of domain consensus is related 
to the relational property of interdependence. 
The next section introduces a aeries of comparative organizational 
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properties that may affect integration in interorganizational relation­
ship s. 
Comparative Properties 
Comparative properties refer to that dimension or continuum in which 
similarity and differences are polar opposites. Comparative properties 
are global dyadic properties reflecting the degree to which elements 
are similar along various dimensions or attributes (Marrett, 1971). 
Normative integration, it was argued, is the result of basic simi­
larities among the elements of a system. Organizations with similar 
characteristics or attributes may more readily achieve consensus over 
domains. Functional integration is premised on basic differences among 
the elements of a system. A direct implication of functional integra­
tion theory is that organizations that possess certain differences are 
more likely to develop interdependences on the basis of their ccmpie-
mentarity. 
This section examines the literature on similarities and differences 
as determinants of integration. The perspective that emphasizes simi­
larity implies that differences are negatively related to integration; 
while the perspective emphasizing complementarity implies that differ­
ences are positively related to integration. These arguments will be 
reviewed, and each comparative property will be discussed and hypotheses 
relating the comparative property to domain consensus and interdependence 
will be presented. 
The four sets of comparative properties are: organizational output, 
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output constituency, decision-making, and decision-maker properties. 
These four represent major sets of comparative properties that have re­
ceived attention in the interorganizational literature. 
Similarity 
Similarity is the degree to which elements resemble or bear likeness 
to one another. It is a basis for association and the formation of 
groups. Individual functions, when in sufficient contact with one an­
other, tend to stabilize and regulate themselves (Durkheim, 1933:4), 
Similarity initially produces association among elements and the poten­
tial for exchanges to occur. The Durkheimian evolutionary argument states 
that though similarity is the early basis of stability in social systems, 
as interdependence increases integration increasingly depends on dif­
ferences and specialization of function, which maintains linkages among 
the elements= 
Regulation of activity among group members can occur only if group 
members are sufficiently familiar with each other's functions, needs, 
and are able to follow their variation in activity (Durkheim, 1933:5). 
Presumably, similarity of function is what makes elements initially 
aware and familiar with each other. Durkheim stressed che role of simi­
larity in promoting normative integration, and of complementary differ­
ences in the maintenance of functional integration. Similarity among 
elements is a basic part of both forms of integration, though the func­
tional type is based on differences evolved frcxn initial association on 
the basis of similarities. From D-.srkheim's perspective, similarities are 
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the starting mechanisms that bring elements into association. 
The ecological perspective incorporates the notion of similarities 
in explaining interdependence. However, as Guetzkow (1966:31) notes, 
little research has employed the concepts of human ecology for under­
standing the mutual relations of organizations and their environments. 
Cotnmensalism and symbiosis are two types of interdependence within this 
perspective. Commensal interdependence is based upon supplementary simi­
larities between units (Hawley, 1950:132). Interdependence based upon 
similarity is viewed as a protective or conservative type of linkage 
since the components are homogeneous with respect to one another. 
Whettan (1974) employs commensalism as an explanatory principle in 
analyzing relationships among organizations sharing a common resource 
base. Division of labor among commensal linkages permits an orderly 
access to common resources by avoiding disruptive disputes over alloca­
tion criteria. The costs of such disputes may exceed the potential gains. 
Some important costs may include risking disruption in the reliable flow 
of resources and loss of favorable image among groups that are indirectly 
involved in the relationship. 
Complementarity 
Complementarity refers to productive differences among elements. 
Durkheim (1933:55) notes that differences, as likeness, can be causes of 
mutual attraction. Some group members may be sought out by others for 
the qualities they lack in themselves. The ecological interpretation of 
this condition is symbiosis, where interdependence is based upon comple­
mentary differences. Symbiosis is predicated on the existence of 
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interlocking needs which cannot be independently met (Hawley, 1950). 
Gouldner (1960:172) has described the group-stabilizing functions 
of complementarity based on structures of interdependence. Actor A's 
rights are B's obligations and vice versa. A relationship based on 
complementarity also may involve intransitive rights and duties, and 
does not necessarily imply the existence of a mutually determined ex­
change relation. Gross (1956) concluded that both symbiosis and con­
sensus operated to integrate the small groups he studied, but that sym­
biosis was a more powerful tie than consensus. 
Commensalism refers to relationships based on shared needs for a 
common resource; symbiosis refers to relationships based on interlock­
ing needs for different types of resources. Both are important factors 
in relations between organizations. Ccmmensalism links organizations 
sharing common activities; symbiosis links organizations engaging in 
separate but related activities. This study focuses on commensaiiscic 
linkages and their consequences for interorganizational relations. 
One important area of comparison for organizations is their domains. 
Two dimensions of domain similarity will be investigated in this study. 
These are organizational output and output constituency. A discussion 
of each type of domain similarity is followed by thm hypotheses that the 
section develops. 
Organizational output and domain consensus 
Social integration theory argues that similarity is associated 
with normative integration, which is reflected in this study by domain 
consensus. Organizacional output variables represent comparisons of 
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the types of services provided by the organizations in a dyad. 
Organizations with similar domains are more likely to be aware of one 
another (Van de Ven et al., 1974). Those that offer similar services may 
have a greater stake in achieving domain consensus because each repre­
sents a salient part of the other's task environment (Dill, 1958). Con­
flict may be costly in terms of lowered effectiveness and loss of con­
stituency support. 
The pursuit of similar goals may foster a division of labor and 
responsibilities between interacting organizations (Reid, 1969). Simi­
larity of function implies rights and obligations between groups; 
rights to operate in a given domain, and obligations Cu minimize in­
trusion on the domains of others. Reciprocally held rights and obli­
gations tend to stabilize and structure ongoing interaction systems 
(Gouldner, 1960). 
Seme organizational functions may be determinant and a division of 
responsibilities easily assigned (Levine and White, 1961). Other func­
tions may not be clearly separable and lines of demarcation between 
organizational activity may be open to question, particularly where organ­
izations perform limited services in a broad problem area. Expectations 
may exceed an organization's capacity or authority to act or be involved. 
Conversely, agencies may claim broader responsibilities in a given prob­
lem area than those sharing similar services are willing to concede. 
On the basis of the previous discussion, the following hypothesis 
may be stated; 
G.H. 2: The comparative property of shared organizational output 
is related to the relational property of domain consensus. 
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Organizational output and interdependence 
Functional integration theory suggests that organizations producing 
different outputs will possess complementary resource needs and capa­
bilities, leading to stronger ties of interdependence. Some writers 
have viewed similarity as a source of avoidance in interorganizational 
relationships (Evan, 1966; White, 1974b). Organizations that offer simi­
lar services may regard each other as threatening, or as constraining 
their individual efforts to offer comprehensive services. Some interde-
pendencies, however, may be unavoidable, and may be conflict issues in 
themselves. This commensalistic interpretation of interdependence em­
phasizes limitations on available resources. 
An alternative argument states that similarity is a strong prerequi­
site for interdependence among organizations. Two organizations may be­
come interdependent if each perceives that its own goals can be achieved 
more effectively with the assistance o£ the resources of che other (Relu, 
1969). Organizations with similar domains are likely to encounter ccsnpa-
rable resource needs and are more likely to be able to employ the re­
sources that the other possesses. Similar resource needs increases the 
likelihood of exchange; competition or conflict also may occur, but are 
generally avoided as the costlier alternative to both parties. 
The central importance of similar organizational outputs in generat­
ing interdependence is the underlying similarity of resource needs that 
it implies. Reid (1969) hypothesizes that the greater the similarity of 
mutually dependent goals, the greater the interdependence, and the 
greater the extent and stability of exchanges. 
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Sharing some functions may be more important than sharing others 
for the development of interdependence. The functions of an organiza­
tion determine its degree of dependence on other groups for specific 
kinds of resources, as well as its capacity to make resources available 
to other groups. The exchange model explains interdependence largely in 
terms of the respective functions performed by the participating agen­
cies (Levine and White, 1961:597). 
The following general hypothesis may now be stated: 
G.H. 3: The comparative property of shared organizational output 
is related to the relational property of interdependence. 
Output constituency and domain consensus 
An output constituency consists of clients that are acknowledged 
by an organization as being appropriate targets of the organization's 
activity (Warren, 1967). Organizations that share client groups may 
encounter gre^Ler xiiut^Licj-v^b Lo ccuimOit d^f^nitLons cf dcmciLn. 
because conflicts may reduce effectiveness, and may interfere in rela­
tions with the client groups that are sources of support and legitima­
tion. 
One cost of a failure to achieve domain consensus for organizations 
that share client groups is the loss of favorable image among these 
groups, which in itself, is an important organizational resource (Perrow, 
1961). The commensalistic argument views clients as a resource that is 
shared in ccsnmon by organizations and requires a mechanism for ensuring 
orderly access to the resource. Domain consensus may be a mechanism for 
allocating the input resource of clients. 
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Organizations that share client groups, but offer sequentially 
related services, may have more clearly defined definitions of domain 
to ensure the orderly flow of inputs and outputs between groups. Domain 
consensus also may be important as a means for maintaining the separate 
identities of the organizations and for distinguishing their activities 
for client groups which may use services from both organizations. Thus 
domain consensus may be a means for preserving the functional autonomy 
of similar organizations whose activities are closely related (Gouldner, 
1959). 
On the basis of the preceding discussion, the following hypothesis 
can be formulated: 
G.H. 4: The comparative property of shared output constituency 
is related to the relational property of demain consensus. 
Output constituency and interdependence 
The argument of the functional integration perspeuLive bLateo that 
differences are associated with interdependence. Organizations that do 
not share output constituencies may be less concerned with competition, 
and more readily develop interdependence. This line of reasoning seems 
less convincing than the contrary view that similarity is a source of 
interdependence, however. 
Organizations with similar output constituencies are more likely 
to seek to increase their effectiveness through exchange of information, 
resources, and joint efforts with other organizations. Shared client 
groups may present a common pressure for unified effort and an inte­
grated set of organizational responses to their specialized problems. 
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Organizations that serve different client systems may possess fewer 
potential resources for interchange than those that share similar client 
systems (Reid, 1969). Referral systems and coordination of financial 
and technical assistance may be sources of interdependence associated 
with common client systems. Little empirical research has investigated 
the importance of shared client groups. 
Organizations with similar client groups may be more likely to be 
linked through their interrelated involvement with the clients (Levine 
and White, 1961). Client groups may come to expect consistency and con­
tinuity in the services they receive from interrelated organizations. 
In this manner shared output constituencies may exert a force totvard 
integrated effort on the part of organizations that provide them with 
services, 
A hypothesis summarizing these arguments may now be stated; 
G.H. 5: The comparative property ot shared output constituency 
is related to the relational property of interdependence. 
Decisionmaking properties 
Comparative decision-making properties are those that refer to the 
differences in the authority structure of interacting organizations. 
Decision-making properties describe the way authority is exercised in an 
organization. Interorganizational relations consists of decisions to 
allocate resources time, staff, and facilities to a relationship. Simi­
lar decision-making structures may facilitate the sequence of decisions 
associated with participation in interorganizational-relationships 
(Schermerhorn, 1975), 
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The specific comparative decision-making properties are: autonomy, 
formalization, and decision-making context. The following subsections 
identify each specific dimension, then hypotheses are developed relating 
the general comparative property to domain consensus and interdependence. 
Autonomy Autonomy is the degree to which a social system has 
the capacity for independent action. Autonomy has been frequently em­
ployed as a motive or inferred dynamic for explaining relations between 
organizations (White, 1974a). The amount and kind of control exerted on 
an organization by superordinate levels may have direct implications for 
the level and kind of linkages it maintains with outside groups. In 
addition, linkages with outside groups may be avoided because they fur-
thur constrain a unit's capacity for independent action (Gouldner, 
1959). 
Formalization Formalization is the degree to which the norms 
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refer to formalization as the codification of activities within an 
organization and the range of variability permitted within job classifi­
cations. Reidel (1970) reported that a high level of formalization, in 
terms of uniform work plans and schedules, kept resource managers re­
sponsive to their own agencies and hindered interagency working relation­
ships. 
Decision context The relationship of interacting groups to an 
over-arching authority structure influences the kinds of linkages that 
can occur (Warren, 1967). Elements that share a subordinate relation­
ship to a common authority may be constrained to a predetermined 
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pattern of relationship. In addition, relationships with groups outside 
the structure may be subject to review by the higher authority. The 
inclusiveness of a decision-making context refers to the extent to which 
a higher authority governs interaction between groups (Warren, 1967). 
Two types of inclusive decision-making structures are the unitary 
and federative contexts (Warren, 1907:402). À unitary context is one 
where the units are deliberately organized for the accomplishment of in­
clusive goals. The top of the structure makes decisions and has final 
authority over the units. A federative structure is one where the units 
involved have their individual goals, but there is some formal organiza­
tion for the accomplishment of inclusive goals. 
Both types of inclusive decision-making structures were identified 
among the organizations in this study. The units in this study which 
are elements of the State Conservation Commission comprise a unitary 
decision-making context. The various units arc interrelated toward t-hp 
achievement of larger Commission objectives, rather than toward their 
own subgoals (Warren, 1967:404). Federal agencies in this study con­
stitute a federative context for decision-making. The various units are 
oriented to individual goals, but an inclusive structure unites the agen­
cies in pursuit of broader rural development goals. The agencies share 
the common authority structure of the USDA, as well as membership in a 
local Rural Development Conmittee which meets periodically to review 
broader concerns and activities shared by the group. 
Each individual property is argued to represent the general compara­
tive property of organizational decision-making. The two following 
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sections relate the general comparative property to domain consensus 
and interdependence, 
Decision-making properties and domain consensus 
Organizations with similar levels of autonomy may more readily es­
tablish mutually acknowledged boundaries of activities. Differences in 
autonomy indicate disparities in the kinds of decisions that can be made 
and the level at which they are processed. Differences may also pre­
sent limitations on the ability of groups to alter their activities with 
respect to one another and to develop reliable definitions of domain. 
Organizations with similar levels of formalization may more readily 
establish domain consensus because of the similar kinds of decision-
processes each must enter into to support a relationship, as well as the 
similar level of predictability of response to each other's actions. 
Braitû et al. (1972) found s. positive relationship between formaliza­
tion and the amount of domain consensus accorded an organization by other 
members of its organization's set. 
Units that comprise an inclusive context for decision-making share 
a common authority to settle questions regarding the division of labor 
over inclusive goals. An inclusive structure permits new allocations of 
authority and responsibility to be carried out in a stable fashion, and 
the new arrangements justified on the basis of common purposes and goals. 
Relationships between USDA agencies and between Conservation Commission 
units are defined as inclusive decision-making contexts in this study. 
The early history of the USDA agencies was characterized by a high 
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level of conflict over domain. The consolidation of the agencies under 
the common USDA structure was a means for achieving and enforcing reso­
lution of these conflicts (Hardin, 1952), Consequently, agencies within 
an inclusive decision-making context should possess a high degree of 
domain consensus because questions of domain are anticipated and admin­
istered by a higher authority. 
Similar intraorganizational structures for decision-making and re­
source allocation may provide a common basis for understanding among 
boundary personnel who are faced with similar constraints and operating 
procedures. The duration and complexity of intraorganizational decision-
processes may affect the relative ability of two organizations to divide 
responsibility where one's activities are closely controlled and the 
other's are relatively unconstrained. The adjustment and definition of 
domains may be increasingly successful as organizations share similar 
decision-making structures and processes. 
In keeping with the preceding discussion, the following hypothesis 
may now be stated: 
G.H. 7; The comparative property of decision-making is related 
to the relational property of domain consensus. 
Decision-making and interdependence 
A positive relationship between formalization and various related 
aspects of interdependence has been a consistent finding in interorgan-
izational research (Aiken and Hage, 1968; Paulson, 1974; Molnar and 
Rogers, 1976). Differences in formalization may affect interdependence 
because agencies with highly formalized intraorganizational decision-
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making structures may have readily available mechanisms for managing 
relations with outside groups. Other agencies that are not highly 
formalized may be reluctant to participate in situations where the rules 
and regulations of a counter organization are a major consideration in 
interaction or where their own internal decision processes are not well-
established in regard to interorganizational relationships. 
Dissimilar levels of autonomy among interacting groups may limit the 
kinds of relationships that can develop. The duration and amount of 
decision-making required for an organization with low autonomy may in­
hibit interaction with other groups that possess greater flexibility. 
However, organizations with low autonomy also may be directed to seek 
and maintain relations with outside groups (Rogers and Molnar, 1975). 
Groups with high autonomy may avoid interdependencies with groups that 
would serve as a constraint on their independent actions, particularly 
if the relationship would be parciaily scructured by a tliiiu-party'» 
rules and regulations. 
Interdependencies are more likely to occur among organizations 
sharing an inclusive decision-making structure. Organizations that 
share a common over-arching authority structure are more likely to en­
gage in exchange relations because of the underlying common purpose to 
their activities. Membership in the inclusive structure also ensures 
duration and continuity to relationships that develop among participating 
groups. In addition, interdependencies may offer little or no threat 
to individual units because budgets are fixed at higher levels, and 
shared system goals increase potential returns for both units. 
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Decision-making is a central or fundamental aspect of interorganiza-
tlonal relationships (White, 1974b; Schermerhorn, 1975). Interaction 
between groups is a product of intraorganizational decision-making 
processes that support commitment and participation in linkages with 
other groups. Douds and Rubenstein (1966) argued that structural dif­
ferences between organizations or units are associated with low levels 
of interface communication that affects the kind of interdependence that 
can develop and be maintained. 
In light of the discussion of specific decision-making properties 
and the general comparative dimension, the following hypothesis may be 
stated. 
G.H. 8: The comparative property of decision-making is related 
to the relational property of interdependence. 
Decision-maker characteristics 
Comparative deuiaiou-makcL characteristics are these that refer tc 
the personal attributes of those in boundary-spanning positions. Organ­
izations that are linlced by compatible boundary-spanning personnel may 
be linked more effectively than those whose personnel are dissimilar in 
their personal characteristics. Similar decision-makers engage in more 
effective communication and problem-solving in interorganizational rela­
tionships (Walton, 1972). 
Four comparative decision-maker characteristics are: time-in-posi-
tion, education, professional activity, and age. These represent major 
dimensions of interpersonal comparison that have been discussed in the 
literature on interunit relations. 
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Tûne-in-position The comparative property of tûne-in-position 
refers to differences in the length of time administrators have held their 
current positions. Thcmias et al. (1972) found newness to position to 
be positively related to two of the three interunit conflict dimensions 
he investigated, specifically, distrust and perceived overstatement of 
needs. 
Education The comparative property of education refers to dif­
ferences in the level of education achieved by individual administrators. 
Education is an important indicator of social class. Ogle (1972) found 
informal interaction among the resource managers he studied to be 
stratified by social class. Educational differences may affect informal 
relationships among administrators, an important aspect of interorganiza-
tional activity. 
Professional activity The comparative property of professional 
activity refers to differences in the level u£ paiLlclyâLion in occupa 
tionally-related voluntary associations. Aiken and Hage (1968) indicate 
that professionalism is related to interorganizational relations in terms 
of the number of joint programs. Professionalism is associated with 
identification with a broader community of individuals who share similar 
occupational orientations. 
Age The comparative property of age refers to differences in 
the chronological ages of decision-makers. Thomas et al. (1972) reported 
age to be negatively related to three aspects of interunit conflict. 
Differences in age may be associated with differences in occupational 
orientation and create communication barriers. Older individuals 
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often entered their occupations with lower levels of education, and 
relate to their current positions in terms of experience and long-term 
organizational involvement. Younger individuals may have arrived at 
their current positions through educational attainment and have dis­
crepant perspectives on purposes and methods of activity, particularly in 
those areas that are not well-defined. 
The next two sections relate the general comparative property of 
decisionmaking characteristics to domain consensus and interdependence. 
Decisionmaker characteristics and demain consensus 
Boundary-spanning roles are often heuristic roles that involve re­
lationships with other groups that are not well-defined or formally 
structured. Effective performance of these roles is associated with 
accumulated experience (Walton, 1972). Because awareness of the responsi­
bilities and potential of other gronns is acquired over time, differ­
ences in time in office may be associated with discrepancies in knowl­
edge and expectations regarding domain. 
Education may be related to the ability of the boundary spanners to 
evaluate and comprehend the specialized activities of other groups. 
Differences in education may be associated with discrepant images of 
the potential activities of outside groups. 
Professionals may more accurately anticipate the domain of a given 
counter organization because of their greater familiarity with the range 
of activities and responsibilities in a given substantive area. Boundary 
personnel may more readily establish interorganizational ties if their 
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counterparts possess similar personal characteristics. The responsi­
bilities and prerogative of interacting groups may be more readily estab­
lished if boundary personnel possess similar perspectives and values 
regarding substantive problems and the means that are to be employed to 
solve them. Similarity in tenure, professionalism, education, and age 
may promote similar definitions of organizational roles and responsibil­
ities. Differences may be associated with disparate perspectives re­
garding the nature of organizational activities and the potential activ­
ities of other groups. 
On the basis of this discussion, the following hypothesis may be 
formulated: 
G.H. 8: The comparative property of decision-maker character­
istics is related to the relational property of domain 
consensus. 
Decision-maker characteristics and interdependence 
Though interdependence between organizations transcends relations 
between individual role incumbents, some linkages may depend on a famil­
iarity with informal procedures and alternative lines of action. Differ­
ences in time in office may be associated with a lesser ability of 
boundary personnel to initiate and manage interdependence. 
Educational differences also may affect the ability of boundary 
personnel to effectively represent their organizations. When activities 
are not well-defined or when educational differences are correlated with 
differences on other personal dimensions, managing interdependence may 
be additionally difficult. 
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Individuals with similar levels of professionalism may more effec­
tively participate in new activities with outside groups because of 
their prior extraorganizational ties. Professionalism was positively 
related to interdependence in Aiken and Rage's (1968) study. 
A number of studies have cited similarity in the qualifications and 
status of boundary personnel as one of several bases for interdependent 
activity among agencies (Reidel, 1970; Ogle, 1972; Thomas et al., 1972). 
Boundary personnel with similar personal characteristics may more readily 
reach agreement over the terms of exchanges, and coordinate their inter­
related organizational activities. 
On the basis of this general discussion, and the discussion of 
specific decision-maker characteristics, the following hypothesis may 
be stated: 
G.H. 9: The comparative property of decision-maker characteris­
tics is related to the relational property of inter­
dependence . 
Figure 2.1 diagrams the relationships expressed in the first nine 
hypotheses. 
Combined effect of comparative properties 
Each of the four sets of comparative properties has been argued to 
be related to domain consensus and interdependence. To assess the com­
bined and independent effects of comparative properties, composite vari­
âtes representing each set will be entered in regression equations pre­
dicting composite domain consensus and interdependence variables. 
None of the individual relationships between the specific variables 
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that compose the four sets of comparative properties will be stated in 
hypothesis form and tested. The relationships between the individual 
variables and domain consensus and interdependence were discussed to 
lend support for examining the relationship between each set and the two 
dependent variables. 
It is hypothesized that the four composite comparative property 
variables, considered together, will predict each composite dependent 
variable. 
G.H. 10: The organizational output, output constituency, 
decision-making, and decision-maker comparative 
properties together predict the relational property 
of demain consensus. 
G.H. 11: The organizational output, output constituency, 
decision-making, and decision-maker comparative 
properties together predict the relational property 
of interdependence. 
The independent and combined effects of the comparative properties 
will be assessed in multiple regression analysis. The lasL liypoLhesis 
examines comparative properties as a control variable in the relation­
ship between the two types of integration. 
Comparative properties controlled 
The collective properties have been hypothesized as collectively 
predicting domain consensus and interdependence. However, the relation­
ship between domain consensus and interdependence may in fact be largely 
due to a common comparative property antecedents. 
Comparative properties are considered to be antecedent variables 
because they are relatively enduring characteristics of the organizational 
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dyad, that are not dependent upon circumstances for their activation 
(Rosenberg, 1968:76). An antecedent variable does not explain away the 
relationship: It clarifies the influences which precede it. 
If the relationship cancels out under control, it can be concluded 
that both variables are the consequences of a common cause, i.e., com­
parative properties. The antecedent variables are actually extraneous 
variables in this case (Rosenberg, 1968:72). 
The following hypothesis states that domain consensus and interde­
pendence are independently related, apart from their common comparative 
property antecedents. 
G.H. 12: Domain consensus is related to interdependence, 
controlling comparative properties. 
Chapter III describes the research procedures that will be employed 
in examining the hypotheses developed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER III. METHODS 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research procedures 
for collecting and analyzing the data used to test the hypotheses de­
veloped in the previous chapter. The major headings in this chapter 
are: (1) Sample and Data Collection Procedures; (2) Formation of Dyads; 
(3) Variable Measures; (4) Multiple Indicator Approaches; and (5) Sta­
tistical Procedures. 
Sample and Data Collection Procedures 
Past interorganizational research has focused on relations among 
business organizations (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), public agencies 
(Rogers, 1974a), voluntary associations (White, 1968), and relationships 
among mixed sets of combinations of the above (Hunt and Hunt, 1971). 
This dissertation will focus on relations among public agencies irrvolved 
in natural resource management. 
The population to which this research is intended to generalize is 
nonmetropolitan public agencies that are involved in the protection and 
management of natural resources. 
Data for this study were collected within the framework of a larger 
research project "Organizations and Agencies for Resource Protection and 
Management", Agricultural Experiment Station project 2042, directed by 
Dr. David L. Rogers. Interviews were conducted with 39 county-level 
administrators in five Northeast Iowa counties during May and June of 
1976. Figure 3.1 shoijs the location of the study counties. The counties 
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Figure 3.1. Counties in the study area 
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were selected on the basis of the unique character of their natural re­
sources. Additional criteria for selection related to the congruence 
of their boundaries with a Resource Conservation and Development project 
area and a State Regional Planning area. The specific counties were: 
Howard, Winneshiek, Allamakee, Fayette, and Clayton. 
The major criteria for selecting agencies for the study were: 
(1) that an agency have at least county-wide responsibility; and (2) that 
it be involved in managing natural resources or have programs that re­
lated to the use of natural resources. The twelve agencies studied 
were; Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS); 
Farmer's Home Administration (FHA); Soil Conservation Service (SCS); 
County Extension Service (CES); County Conservation Board (CCB); County 
Engineer's Office (CEO); Fish and Game Enforcement (FGE); District 
Forester Unit (DFU); State Park Ranger (SPR); State Forest Administrative 
Unit (SFA); Fish Management Biologist Unit (FMB); and Wildlife Biologist 
Unit (WBU). In each agency, the top administrator was selected for the 
interview. 
Not every agency had a local unit in each of the counties studied, 
therefore, the number of units studied was 39. In instances where an 
agency had multicounty responsibilities, it was included in the county 
where its base of operations was located. Units of the FHA, FGE, DFU, 
FMB, and WBU were so classified. A District Forester operated in two of 
the study counties, but his office was located outside the study area. 
The interview in this situation was conducted within the context of the 
county where the agency was most active and with which the respondent 
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was most familiar. A brief description of each of the agencies 
studied follows. 
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service 
The ASCS is a U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) agency organized 
on a county basis. It provides cost-share funds to landowners who in­
stall permanent soil and water conservation practices on their land. 
Long-term agreements also are possible and provide cost-share funds to 
support soil and water conservation measures. A proportion of these funds 
(about 5 percent) are allocated to the Soil Conservation Service for 
technical assistance. The Forest Incentive Program is designed to en­
courage timber production practices in designated counties, and the Dis­
trict Forester provides planning and technical assistance for this pro­
gram. The ASCS also administers price support programs on selected com­
modities. Elected county ccomittcczicn and appointed state committeemen 
set local and state policies and make cost-share allocation decisions on 
the local level. The ASCS also disburses special disaster funds to 
fanners and landowners whose lands have been damaged by drought or floods. 
Farmer's Home Administration 
The Farmer's Home Administration is a USDA agency that provides 
housing loans for private individuals in small towns and cities, as well 
as industrial loans. In addition, the FHA provides financial assistance 
to fanners and rural groups for developing water supply and sewage systems. 
Resource Conservation and Development loans are made to public bodies and 
to nonprofit corporations for open space acquisition, recreation 
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development and water supply projects. FHA soil and water loans support 
a variety of activities including farm pond construction and repair, 
land treatment practices, and the establishment of approved forestry 
practices. Recreation loans are made to assist eligible farmers who wish 
to convert all or part of their land to income-producing recreation 
enterprises. FHA county supervisors provide planning and management 
assistance to recipients of all categories of loans. A three-member 
county committee determines eligibility and the maximum amount of funds 
that can be borrowed. 
Soil Conservation Service 
The Soil Conservation Service (SCS) provides technical assistance 
to individuals, groups, and governmental bodies. At the county level, 
this USDA agency is linked to state soil conservation districts. These 
districts are administered by the Iowa State Department of Soil Conser­
vation. The districts receive state soil conservation funds, in addition 
to federal funds. Local policies and priorities are established by local 
district commissioners. The District Conservationist's direct supervi­
sor is an Area Conservationist, who possesses a staff with broader 
engineering and planning capability who can be consulted for special 
problems. The SCS provides financial and technical assistance for con­
servation land treatment and watershed protection. The SCS soil survey 
is a resource inventory that provides basic planning data. Soil treat­
ment practices, design of small water impoundments, and water drainage 
management are major SCS activities. 
67 
Cooperative Extension Service 
The fourth USDA agency is the Extension Service. Its central goal 
or mission is education. County Extension directors assist residents, 
particularly farmers, in interpreting problems, and apply technology 
based on research by Land Grant universities, the USDA, and other 
sources. Extension Home Economists provide assistance for home and 
family problems, and the 4-H youth development programs are designed to 
help young people develop effective citizenship. Area office specialists 
are available to assist county agents with specific needs or problems and 
to provide special services. Extension personnel work with other USDA 
agencies in supplying information on conservation-oriented farming prac­
tices, particularly with regard to plowing practices and the application 
of pesticides. In addition, Extension conducts programs to familiarize 
interested residents with trends and problems in the use of land resources. 
County Conservation Board 
County Conservation Boards have been established in 97 Iowa counties 
and in four of the five counties in the study area. The Executive Officer 
carries out policies established by a three-member park board and makes 
day-irn-day decision regarding the management of county lands and parks. 
The State Conservation Commission oversees planning activities and large 
expenditures by the county boards. It assists in providing broad uni­
formity and direction to local county operations. Conservation Boards 
also provide water recreation, including canoeing and swimming. Scsne 
boards maintain environmental education programs, often in conjunction 
with local school systems. 
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County Engineer Office 
County Engineers are responsible for the design and maintenance of 
county roads and bridges, as well as the enforcement of county planning 
and zoning regulations. The Engineer's Office is also responsible for 
enforcing county sanitation ordinances, particularly landfill and sewage 
disposal regulations. The County Engineer's activities frequently in­
volve the provision of access to public recreation facilities, stream 
channelizations, and waterway diversions. 
Fish and Game Enforcement 
Fish and Game Officers are employed by the Iowa Conservation Com­
mission. As deputized peace officers, they are responsible for enforcing 
the state's fish and wildlife laws, including licensing, capture limits 
and other regulations. They often refer pollution problems, stream manage­
ment abuses, and other situations to the properly responsible agency. 
Fish and Game Officers may be the most visible symbol of resource manage­
ment to the general public. An experienced officer is designated as a 
senior or "lead" officer to provide direction in multicounty areas. 
Some of their other duties include field surveys, hunter safety programs 
and investigations, and local public relations. 
District Forester 
The objective of the Forestry Section of the Iowa Conservation Com­
mission is to foster environmental protection and to ensure econmic and 
social benefits fran trees, forest lands, and related resources. Eleven 
forestry units are distributed across the state. District Foresters 
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assist landowners and local groups through applied forestry practices, 
particularly the development of forestry management plans. Foresters are 
responsible for the technical phases and inspections of ASCS cost-share 
forestry practices, including tree-planting, and timber-stand improve­
ment, A state tree farm program provides management assistance to land­
owners involved in continued production of a forest crop. The District 
Forester collaborates with other sections of the Conservation Commission 
in forest management matters on state lands. The Forester also provides 
technical assistance on ASCS loans that involve wooded areas or wind­
break construction, particularly for the purpose of preserving wildlife 
habitat. 
State Park Ranger Unit 
The State Park Ranger is charged with preserving and maintaining 
state parks and preser<.'e areas^ Park rangers are stationed at the state's 
larger holdings and oversee the maintenance and security of these areas. 
Three district supervisors direct the park ranger force throughout the 
state. Rangers are responsible for maintaining the parts as refuges 
for fish and wildlife, as well as providing recreation opportunities for 
the general public. 
State Forest Administrative Unit 
The Yellow River State Forest is a 6,000-acre multiple-use area. 
The manager's responsibilities include management of game and forested 
acreage, operation of a sawmill, and the maintenance and supervision of 
recreational facilities. The forest serves as a research and 
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demonstration area for state land management practices. The unit also 
provides forest management training seminars for resource management 
personnel. 
Fish Management Biologist Unit 
The goal of the Fish Management Biologist Unit is to improve fishing 
and to bring about a greater harvest of fish from existing waters through 
the latest scientific fish management techniques. Fish Management Biolo­
gists provide a variety of services to other sections of the Conservation 
Commission as well as to private landowners. They participate in the 
planning and management of trout-stocking programs, private farm pond 
planning, and fish population management. The Mississippi River presents 
special problems in terms of pollution management, commercial fishing 
supervision, and dredge spoils management. These units are directly re­
sponsible to the Fisheries section of the Towa Conservation Ccmmission. 
Wildlife Biologist Unit 
The Wildlife Biologist Unit's goals are to provide wildlife manage­
ment activities in the form of land and water management, the recrea­
tional harvest of animals, and to provide state and private technical 
assistance. The Wildlife Biologist Unit is particularly concerned with 
the maintenance of wildlife habitats on private land. Its major objec­
tive is to offer the greatest opportunities for game harvest without 
jeopardizing the many species involved. The 20 Wildlife Management Biol­
ogist Units in the state engage in investigative studies of animal popu­
lations to set realistic game seasons. The Wildlife Section of the Iowa 
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Conservation Commission manages lands designated as game management 
areas that provide game protection, as well as controlled opportunities 
for hunting and trapping. 
The Formation of Dyads 
The group of agencies in each of the five counties was defined as 
an organization set (Evan, 1965). An organization was included in a 
particular set for one of three reasons: (1) its jurisdiction was 
limited to that county; (2) its jurisdiction was multicounty, but the 
base office was located in the study county; (3) the base office was 
located outside the study area, but included one or more study counties; 
here the agency was then included in a set where it was most active and 
with which the respondent was most familiar. 
Each organization set was combinatorially arranged to form all pos­
sible organizacional dyads, A aeL ol N gùûiLiona foims (N(w-l))/2 
dyads. Thus the 4 agencies in Howard County formed 6 dyads- the 9 in 
Winneshiek formed 35 dyads, the 6 in Allamakee formed 15 dyads, and the 
10 agencies in Fayette and in Clayton Counties each formed 45 dyads. From 
the total sample of 39 organizations 147 organizational dyads were de­
fined. 
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of dyad types. The lower triangu­
lar matrix of relationships is that of all nonredundant organizational 
dyads. The number indicates how frequently each type of relationship 
occurred in the sample. Some relationships occur more often than others 
because of the uneven distribution of agencies within the study area. 
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Table 3.1. Distribution of organizational dyads in sample 
ASCS FHA ses EXT CCB CPZ FGE DFU SPR SFA FMB WBU 
ASCS -
FHA 3 -
ses 5 3 -
CES 5 3 5 -
CCB 4 3 4 4 -
CPZ 4 3 4 4 3 -
FGE 4 3 4 4 3 4 -
DFO 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 -
S PR 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 -
SFA 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
FMB 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 u u -
WBU 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 1 
The unit of analysis or case in this study is the dyad. The dyad 
A-B consists of the data for organization A followed by the data for 
organization B. Relational and comparative dyadic variables are derived 
from combined operations on both sets of variables. The next section 
describes these operations. 
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Variable Measures 
This section will explain how dyadic properties are derived and 
the procedures for measuring specific variables. A rationale for the 
measurement of each variable will be presented, particularly in the con­
text of interorganizational research. The operational measures, scoring 
system, and range for each variable also will be discussed. 
Dyadic scoring procedures 
Dyadic variables in this study represent either a comparative 
property of the two organizations that emprise the dyad, or a relational 
property of the linkage between the dyadic elements. In the case of com­
parative variables, or those that represent similarity, analysis is 
based on the absolute value of the difference between the scores on a 
particular variable for dyadic element A and dyadic element B. Mathe­
matically, the dyad score D is computed by the following formula: 
D = A - B . Thus, a score of 2 for A and 5 for B is associated with a 
dyadic D score of 3 (3 = 2 - 5 ). This measure captures the cempara-
tive property of similarity as a general nondirectional concept (Vincent, 
1975:174). 
Relational properties are those that refer to the interaction or 
linkage between elements (Coleman, 1960). Relational properties also 
refer to mutual evaluations among elements. The relational properties 
referring to interaction are computed by summing the reports of inter­
action in a relationship. A's reports of interaction with element B are 
added to B's reports of interaction with element A forming a measure of 
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the total interaction in a relationship. Relational properties of eval­
uation are derived by summing deviations in mutual evaluations within 
dyadic relationships. 
In this study, relational properties are asserted to be a conse­
quence of relative differences between organizations on their compara­
tive properties. 
Domain consensus 
Danain consensus was previously defined at the extent to which con­
gruent expectations regarding roles and responsibilities exist between 
a given organization and any member of its organization set. Braito 
et al. (1972) measured domain consensus with a single-item indicator 
referring to the extent to which an organization should be involved in 
an interorganizational effort among health organizations. Vacin (1972) 
employed a similar measure in a study of rural development organizations. 
Three measures of domain consensus in an organizational dyad will 
be used in this study. Each refers to a separate natural resource prob­
lem area, selected as potentially involving any or all the agencies 
in the study. Respondents were asked to project their own organization's 
involvement in each of the situations, as well as the involvement of 
each of the other organizations in the county. The three questions 
were as follows: 
Domaim - housing development - A private land development 
firm reveals its plans for a large summer cottage and rec­
reation area adjacent to one of the county's major rivers. 
To what extent should each of the following groups be in­
volved in planning, managing, facilitating, or assessing 
the impact of this project? 
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Domain? - feedlot construction - Plans are announced for 
a large-scale feedlot facility to be built on previously 
undeveloped land in the county. To what extent should each 
of the following groups be involved in planning, managing, 
facilitating, or assessing the impact of this project? 
Domain-^ - scenic river system - A portion of a river system 
in your county is designated as a scenic area by the Federal 
government, and a sum of money is set aside for its develop­
ment. To what extent should each of the following groups be 
involved in planning, managing, facilitating, or assessing 
the impact of this project? 
The respondents rated their own involvement, and the involvement of 
other organizations, in terms of a five-level Likert response framework. 
The responses were: "to a very little extent", "to a little extent", 
"to some extent", "to a great extent", and "to a very great extent". 
The responses were coded 1 to 5, respectively. 
The questions permit the examination of the extent to which common 
definitions of responsibility and activity exist in a given organizational 
dyad. The derivation of a score on a single question for a dyad consist­
ing of organizations A and B is described as follows. A^ is the score 
associated with A's own rating. A^ is A's rating of B. B^ is B's own 
rating, and B^ is B's rating of A, 
Rated Organizations 
A B 
^ ^a \ 
Rating Organizations 
B B, B, 
The formula for the computation of the domain consensus indices is 
A - B + B, - A, 0 The absolues value of the difference between 
a a b 1) 
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A's assessment of his organization's own involvement minus B's assessment 
of A's involvement is added to the corresponding absolute value of the 
difference between B's own rating and A's rating of B. The total repre­
sents the domain consensus score for that item. 
Comparisons between A^ and B^, and A^ and B^ are also possible dif­
ferences, but not considered relevant for this study. Sound reasons 
may exist for differential levels of involvement in a given problem area 
for different organizations. The measure captures deviations in expecta­
tions of involvement, and not actual levels of involvement. The notion 
of congruent expectations is central to the concept of domain consensus. 
The sum of the deviations in expected involvement was obtained for 
each of the three items. The theoretical range for each index is 0 to 8. 
Scores were recoded to associate a high score with high consensus and a 
low score with low consensus about organizational domain. The three 
indices were treated as indicators of the concept of domain consensus. 
Interdependence 
Joint programs Thompson and McEwan (1958) state that a joint 
program is the case where two organizations act as one to attain certain 
goals. Aiken and Hage (1968) employed the number of joint programs as a 
measure of interdependence between organizations. Rogers (1974b) used 
the number of joint programs as an indicator of reciprocal relations in 
interorganizational networks. Aiken and Hage argue that joint programs 
represent a more permanent interorganizational relationship than do 
other measures. 
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Each of the organizational units was asked the following ques­
tion concerning its relationship with other members of the organization 
set. 
What is the actual number of joint programs that your 
organization shares with each of the following groups? 
The reports of organization A's joint programming with organiza­
tion B and B's reports of programs with A were summed to form an index. 
Each joint program was scored 2, because reports from both organizations 
were summed. 
This variable reflects a difficulty common to much sociometric re­
search; intransitivity in reports of interaction. In this study, dis­
crepant reports were assumed to be random, and nonsystematic. Conse­
quently, the sum of the number reported by both groups was utilized as 
an indicator. 
The distribution on this variable was extremely skewed (i.e.. 60.5 
percent reported no joint programs). A few organizations specified 
their joint activities in great detail and were associated with high 
scores of 8 and 9. The relatively small sample size would exaggerate 
the effect of these extreme values in statistical analysis. As a result, 
these scores were considered to be outlying values that did not fairly 
represent the relationship. They were recoded to the value 5 to allevi­
ate skewness in the distribution (5 was the next occurring actual value), 
The range of the joint programming variable is 0 to 5. A score of 
0 indicates that no joint programming was reported in the relationship, 
a score of 5 indicates that 5 or more joint programs were reported. A 
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high score indicates a high level of joint programming in a dyadic rela­
tionship. 
Resource exchange In this study resource exchange is defined in 
terms of the frequency of resource exchange. Marrett (1971) states that 
the frequency of exchange is one indicator of the intensity of interorgan-
izational relations. Finley (1969) employed resource exchange as a meas­
ure of interorganizational relations. Rogers (1974b) included resource 
exchange as one step in a scale of intensity of relations between groups. 
Administrators were asked the following question about their rela­
tionship with other groups. 
In the past ye"r, how many times did your organization loan 
or provide rt; crces (funds, facilities, or personnel) to 
each of the following groups. 
Weekly or more reports were coded 50; otherwise the actual number of 
times was recorded. The mutual reports of organization A extending re­
sources to B and B to A were summed to form an index of total resource 
interdependence. The actual range of the sum of these reports was 0 to 
100. A high score equals a high frequency of resource flows between 
organizations. 
Information exchange Information exchange was defined in terms 
of the intensity of information flows between organizations. Levine and 
White (1961) include information as one of several possible elements of 
exchange. Rogers (1974b) included information exchange as one step in 
a scale of the intensity of interorganizational relations. The ques­
tion relating to information exchange was: 
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In the past year, how many times did your organization 
provide information to each of the following groups 
through personnel letters, reports, or other documents. 
Weekly or more reports were coded 50; otherwise the actual number 
of times was recorded. The mutual reports of A providing information 
to B and B to A were summed to form an index of total information inter­
dependence. The actual range of this measure was 0 to 100. A high score 
equals a high frequency of information flow between organizations. 
The first empirical hypothesis may now be stated: 
E.H. 1.1: The set of demain consensus variables is related 
to the set of interdependence variables. 
Organizational output 
Organizational output variables are those that represent whether 
or not dyads share particular services, the similarity of the products 
two organizations provide to their environment. Aldrich (1974) had ad-
ûilLiI.âuL'àLOrs râuc Luc Sc-i"vlCc uupllCâuiOit Cf îllic cuiployïûctiu ScîTvxCc iu 
his study of its relations with other manpoiver organizations. Warren 
(1972) utilized a variable termed domain overlap in his study of com­
munity decision organizations that was developed through judgmental cod­
ing of qualitative data. The set of indicators in this study consists 
of a series of dummy variables representing whether a pair of agencies 
shared or did not share each individual service. 
Respondents were asked: 
Please indicate which of the following categories describes 
the activities your organization is involved in. 
The categories included: regulatory activities, cost-sharing, 
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technical assistance, planning assistance, information assistance, 
financial assistance, and management-development activities (of land). 
Responses were coded 1 for yes, 0 for no. 
Dummy variables indicating individual shared activities were formed 
by comparing each activity of organization A with the corresponding 
activity of organization B. If both were engaged in an activity, a score 
of one was assigned; if one or neither were involved, a score of zero 
was assigned. Each variable is dichotomous, having a range of 0 to 1. 
The empirical hypotheses may now be stated: 
E.H. 2.1: The set of organizational output variables is re­
lated to the set of domain consensus variables. 
E.H. 3.1: The set of organizational output variables is re­
lated to the set of interdependence variables. 
Output constituency 
Output constituency variables are those that reflect whether or not 
dyads share particular client groups, the similarity of the groups that 
receive the products an organization provides to its environment. No 
studies were found that employed a measure of client group similarity. 
Respondents were asked: 
Please indicate which of the following categories de­
scribes the groups your organization serves. 
The categories included farmers, private industry, recreational 
user, nonfarm landowners, park-users, hcmeox-mers, and local agencies. 
Positive responses were coded 1, negative responses were coded 0. 
If both organizations A and B indicated that they served a particu­
lar client group, a score of 1 was assigned to the dyad. If only one or 
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neither organization served the group, a score of 0 was assigned. Each 
client group was included in the set of variables as a dummy variable 
coded 0 to 1. The variables are dichotomous having a range of 0 to 1. 
The empirical hypotheses state: 
E.H. 4.1: The set of output constituency variables are re­
lated to the set of domain consensus variables. 
E.H. 5.1: The set of output constituency variables are re­
lated to the set of interdependence variables. 
Decision-making variables 
Autonomy Autonomy refers to the degree to which an organization 
is free to make decisions with respect to its own operations. Inkson 
et al. (1970) measured autonomy by counting the number of types of deci­
sions that could be made inside the organization. Previous studies have 
measured autnoray by counting the number of extraorganizational sources 
of new programming efforts (Molnar and Rogers. 1976). In this study, 
autonomy was measured by eight interview items reflecting the kind of 
decision-making that occurred in the organization. 
a. Out unit's decisions are limited by specific requirements 
set by higher administrative units. 
b. Most planning for our unit takes place in higher adminis­
trative units. 
c. Regulations established by higher administrative units 
limit what we can do with other units. 
d. Our superiors rarely issue explicit directions for our 
activities (reverse coded) 
e. Our unit is free to develop new projects with other 
organizations (reverse coded) 
f. Our activities and accomplishments are closely monitored 
by higher administrative levels. 
g. Higher administrative units provide a large amount of 
programming direction. 
h. Our unit has authority to develop its own programs. 
(reverse coded) 
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Each item was responded to in terms of a seven-level Likert re­
sponse framework. The responses were scored: 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = 
disagree; 3 = slightly disagree; 4 = undecided; 5 = slightly agree; 6 = 
agree; 7 = strongly agree. Responses were recoded on the indicated items 
to provide consistency in direction. 
The items were examined for internal consistency in the sample of 
39 individual organizations. The eight items employed here demonstrated 
an internal consistency reliability of .81 (Cronbach, 1951). 
A score was derived for each dyad by summing individual item differ­
ences across the eight items. Summing absolute differences across items 
is a dyadic measurement procedure recommended by Cronbach (1958). 
The theoretical range of the dyad score is 0 to 48. A score of zero 
would occur when there is no difference across eight items. A score of 
48 is associated with maximal differences in autonomy (8 x |7 - l| = 48). 
The actual range of the autonomy dyad score was 1 to Z/. A high 
score indicates a high difference in organizational autonomy. 
Formalization Formalization refers to the degree to which rules 
and procedures used in decision-making occur in written form. Aiken and 
Hage (1968) measured formalization in terms of job codification and the 
variability permitted within classifications. A measure similar to the 
one in this study was used by Molnar and Rogers (1976), though it differs 
by one item, "written operating policies" instead of "office procedure 
manual". Both items were included in the study, but the choice for the 
index was made on empirical grounds, i.e., maximum reliability. In this 
study, the extent to which written policies are detailed is the measure 
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of formalization. Three items were used to measure this variable. 
a. In terms of expected behavior and activities, which of the 
categories best describes your written job descriptions? 
b. In terms of expected behavior and activities, which of the 
categories best describes your written personnel policies? 
u. Ill Lems of expected behavior and activities, which of the 
categories best describes your written operating policies 
and guidelines? 
The response categories and codes were: 0 = does not exist; 1 = very 
general; 2 = somewhat general; 3 = somewhat detailed; and 4 = very de­
tailed. 
These items demonstrated an internal consistency reliability of .79 
in the individual sample of 39 agencies (Cronbach, 1951). 
Scores were derived for each dyad by summing the differences across 
individual items, as recommended by Cronbach (1958). The theoretical 
range for this variable is 0 to 12. The actual range is 0 to 8. A high 
score indicates a high difference in formalization, a low score, low 
differences in formalization. 
Decision-making context Warren (1967) introduced a typology of 
decision-making contexts based on the relative inclusiveness of the 
structure in which relations took place. The four types of context are; 
(1) unitary; (2) federative; (3) coalitional; and (4) social choice. 
No studies were found that examined decision-making context as an inter-
organizational variable. The measure in this study contrasts the more 
inclusive unitary and federative contexts with the less inclusive coali­
tional and social choice contexts. 
A unitary context of decision-making is one where units are organ­
ized for the deliberate achievement of the inclusive goals. A federative 
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context is one where individual units have their own goals but there 
is some formal organization for the purpose of accomplishing inclusive 
goals. 
Relationships among the several units of the Conservation Commission 
were defined as a unitary context for decision-making. Dyads composed 
of relationships between Fish and Game Enforcement, District Forester 
Unit, State Forest Administrative Unit, Park Ranger Unit, Fish Manage­
ment Biologist Unit, and the Wildlife Biologist Unit were classified as 
unitary contexts. 
The Federal agencies in each study county are members of a Rural 
Development Committee that constitutes a formal interagency structure 
for decision-making. In addition, each of these agencies is tied to the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, though they are separately administered. 
These agencies are: Soil Conservation Service, Farmer's Home Administra­
tion, Agricultural stabilization and Conservation Service, and the Ex­
tension Service. 
Relationships in which both organizations were federal agencies or 
both were state agencies were defined as constituting an inclusive deci­
sion-making context. A dummy variable representing inclusive decision­
making context was developed by assigning a score of 1 to dyads of 
Federal-Federal agency relations, and State-State agency relations, and 
a score of zero to all others. A dichotomous item, the range is 0 to 1. 
The decision-making variables that have been discussed may now be 
empirically related to domain consensus and interdependence. 
E.H. 6.1: The set of decision-making variables is related 
to the set of domain consensus variables. 
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E.H. 7.1: The set of decision-making variables is related 
to the set of interdependence variables. 
Decision-maker variables 
Tenure Tenure refers to the administrator's length of time in 
his current position. Respondents were asked the following question; 
How long have you held your present position in your 
organization? 
The actual number of years were recorded. Those in position less 
than one year were assigned a score of 1» The score assigned each dyad 
represents the absolute value of the difference in tenure in current 
position. The actual range was 0 to 27. 
Professional activity Professional activity was defined as the 
level of extraorganizational involvement in professional voluntary asso­
ciations. This variable was measured by asking: 
Do you belong to any professional associations? Which 
one a? 
The number of professional involvements were counted and summed to 
form an index of professional activity. The dyad score represents the dif­
ference in level of professional activity. The actual range of this 
variable was 0 to 8. 
Education Education refers to the level of formal schooling. 
Respondents were asked the following question: 
Please indicate the highest level of formal achievement 
that you have achieved. 
Response categories and codes were: 1 = high school; 2 = some col­
lege; 3 = college degree; 4 = graduate work; 5 = graduate degree. The 
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dyad score reflects the difference in level of education between admin­
istrators. The theoretical range of this variable is 0 to 4. The 
actual range is 0 to 4. 
Age Age refers to the respondents chronological age. Respond­
ents were asked: 
What is your age? 
The actual number of years was recorded. The dyad score represents 
the difference in age of administrators. The actual range of this vari­
able is 0 to 36. 
The comparative property of decision-maker characteristics is com­
posed of the following variables: tenure, professional activity, educa­
tion, and age. The following hypotheses may now be presented. 
E.H, 8.1; The set of decision-maker variables is related to 
the set of domain consensus variables. 
E.H. 9.1: The set of decision-maker variables is related to 
The next section surveys some of the major approaches to the anal­
ysis of multiple indicators in sociological research. 
Multiple Indicator Approaches 
This section briefly reviews a series of approaches to combining 
indicators and assessing the relationship between sets of indicators. A 
major distinction in categorizing methods of combining sets of indicators 
is between internally defined composites and composites defined in terms 
of a second criterion variable or set of variables. 
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Internally defined composites 
Internally defined composites are formed according to the structure 
of relationships within a set of variables. Three variations on this 
approach are: simple composites, factor analysis, and Guttman scaling. 
Simple composites Simple composites or scales, assume a linear 
additive model among a set of interval-level indicators, and assumes that 
all are equally representative of a concept, and that all should receive 
equal weight in a composite. The internal consistency reliability of 
a set of indicators is a frequently employed means for assessing the 
assumptions of equal utility and equal weight (Cronbach, 1951). 
Factor analysis Factor analysis is a family of statistical tech­
niques that determine the minimum number of constructs (factors) neces­
sary to account for the interrelationships among a group of variables 
(Brown, 1970). The proportion of the total variance in a set of vari­
ables âCCOUuucd for by â jiacuoi." Lilt: cuuuiioii xcicLui.' variance. Assuming 
that a single principle component describes a set, the remaining variance 
is considered to represent error or extraneous variance. The factor 
score coefficients or loadings of each item on the factor are then used 
as weights to compute the composite measure (Nie et al.,1975). Factor 
analysis assumes the existence of a commonly-shared dimension of vari­
ance in order to develop a composite that best represents that variance. 
Guttman scaling Guttman scaling assumes an internal step-wise 
or sequential ordering among dichotomized variables. Guttman analysis 
is centrally evaluated by the reproducibility of a set of items. Re­
producibility is the degree to which the scale score is a predictor 
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of the response pattern which it represents (Edwards, 1948). 
Externally defined composites 
Externally defined multiple indicator composites are formed accord­
ing to the structure of relationships between sets of variables. Gen­
erally, the sets of variables are theoretically meaningful as represent­
ing abstract concepts, and the researcher desires a means for deriving 
a consistent estimate of the relationship between the two concepts. A 
number of approaches have been suggested for combining indicators and 
estimating relationships, particularly in reference to overidentified 
path models (Meyer and Younger, 1974). Four approaches to combining 
multiple indicators are: Costner's consistency, Joreskog's maximum-
likelihood, canonical correlation, and block regression. 
Costner's consistency Costner (1969) explores the relationship 
between abstract variables by analyzing the relationship between ob­
servable indicators of two concepts. The approach is centrally directed 
to assessing whether or not particular variables are inadequate for test­
ing the implications of a relationship between sets of indicators because 
of artifactual measurement error (Costner, 1969:246). The technique 
provides a means for assessing the presence of differential bias, or 
common variation external to the postulated conceptual relationship. 
In addition, the method generates a number of estimates of the unknown 
coefficient that describes the relationship between sets. The method is 
limited because no techniques exist for testing the statistical signif­
icance of the estimates, nor of deciding which estimate is to be chosen 
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as representing the relationship. Hauser and Goldberger (1971) have 
partially removed the first limitation through the maximum likelihood 
estimation method. 
Joreskog's maximum likelihood 
Joreskog (1973) has introduced a general method for estimating un­
known coefficients in multiple indicator relationships. The technique 
uses maximum likelihood procedures, which are related to factor analysis 
and covariance structure models. Coefficient estimates are derived and 
tests made regarding the goodness-of-fit of a specified model in describ­
ing the relationship between sets of variables. These procedures are 
important innovations in the study of multiple indicator relationships 
because of their generalizability and flexibility in testing models based 
on a variety of assumptions. 
A major disadvantage of this technique is its statistical sophisti­
cation and the dearth of literature regarding its practical application 
and implementation in sociological research. 
Canonical correlation Canonical correlation will be more fully 
described in a following section because it is employed in this study. 
One basic goal of canonical analysis is to use the observable multi­
variate relationship between sets of indicators to make inferences about 
the unobservable relationship between the abstract variables (Meyer and 
Younger, 1974:194). This approach overcomes seme of the limitations 
associated with Costner's consistency by providing a statistical test of 
a specified model between sets of variables, as well as a single, 
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empirically derived estimate of that relationship. Van Valey (1971) com­
pared results obtained through Costner's consistency procedure and canon­
ical correlation, finding similar results, though the canonical estimates 
were more conservative. 
Block regression In block regression analysis, a composite 
independent variable is defined on the basis of the linear combination of 
the indicators created by regression analysis. This technique enables 
the effect of a set of variables to be summarized in a multiple correla­
tion coefficient: statistical control is achieved through multiple-
partial correlations and sequential F-tests. Coleman (1976) employed com­
pound block regression variables to analyze indirect effects of sets of 
variables that would otherwise be unobtainable through standard methods. 
This study employs block regression techniques to verify the results of 
canonical analysis, and to overcome some of the limitations of canonical 
analysis that are associated with multiple independent variable seLs. 
This section has briefly reviewed the major approaches to ccoibining 
sets of indicators and assessing the relationship between sets of indica­
tors. Two of these approaches will be employed in the present study: 
canonical correlation and simple composites. Canonical correlation asses­
ses the nature of the relationship between sets of variables and sum­
marizes the internal structure of that relationship. Simple composites 
help overcome some of the limitations of canonical correlation in de­
scribing the combined and separate effects of multiple sets. The next 
section describes these approaches. 
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Statistical Procedures 
Two general statistical procedures will be employed in testing the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter II. Canonical correlations will be em­
ployed to evaluate the hypotheses relating sets of variables, and to 
develop composites representing each set. Multiple regression analysis 
will be used to determine the independent effects of composite variates 
in relation to composite domain consensus and interdependence variables. 
The formation of composites will be described in a final section. 
Canonical correlation 
Canonical correlation is a general technique for determining the 
relationship between two sets of variables. Canonical correlation is the 
general case of multiple regression analysis with k independent variables 
and m dependent variables. Multiple regression is the case where m = 1. 
The basic idea for canonical correlation is that, through leaat 
squares analysis, two linear composites are formed, one for the independ­
ent variables X, , and one for the dependent variables Y . The correlation 
K m 
between these two composites is the canonical correlation R^. The square 
of the canonical correlation, also termed the eigenvalue, is an estimate 
of the variance shared by the two composites. Lyttkens (1972) provides 
a concise summary of the statistical derivations of canonical corre­
lation. 
Canonical correlation is similar to factor analysis in that the 
variance structure of a set of variables contains as many dimensions as 
there are variables in the set (Stewart and Love, 1968). The first 
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canonical factor, however, is the best linear function of the first set 
of variables, given a similarly optimized linear function of the second 
set. In factor analysis, variance is optimized within sets, in canon­
ical correlation variance is optimized between sets. The correlation be­
tween canonical variates or composites is the maximum possible between 
two sets of variables (Hotelling, 1935). 
Canonical correlation produces partial coefficients that are 
analogous to unstandardized regression coefficients. However, the corre­
lations of the original variable to the resulting canonical variate pre­
sent a more readily interpretable indication of the relative contribution 
of the original in determining the canonical variate (Nie et al., 1975). 
Item-to-variate correlations may be interpreted in the same way that 
factor loadings are interpreted in factor analysis, since factor loadings 
are the correlations between the original variables and the derived fac­
tors (Pohiman, 1975). The item-co-variace loadings also indicate Lhe 
importance of a particular variable in determining the relationship with 
another set. The technique maximizes the relationship between sets of 
variables; variables that are more heavily weighted play a larger part in 
determining that relationship. 
Canonical correlation is a data reduction technique. Where theory 
leads to a global hypothesis, a direct test by means of an overall index 
is appropriate. Analytic treatment of separate variables and separate 
components introduces a large number of significance tests, with the re­
sult that no single statement regarding significance can be taken at face 
value and the study becomes purely exploratory (Cronbach, 1958:366). 
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Canonical correlation provides a means for examining a broad hypoth­
esis in a multivariate manner, leading to inferences about the overall 
pattern of relationships between sets of indicators. 
Assumptions of canonical correlation Canonical correlation is 
the general case of multiple regression analysis. As such, the assump­
tions of the two approaches are related. Four basic assumptions of 
regression analysis are: a linear model, an additive model, uncorrelated 
independent variables, and interval variable measurement. These assump­
tions are somewhat different in canonical analysis, however. 
Assuming a linear statistical model means that the researcher is 
willing to believe that the data are best described by a straight line, 
and the relationships described do not involve sudden changes of state, 
i.e., they are continuous, and the relationships are not curvilinear. 
Canonical correlation assumes a linear model for both dependent and inde­
pendent variables. 
An additive statistical model means that variables affect each 
other in an arichmetic manner, and do not involve multiplicative or inter 
action effects. Canonical correlation assumes that additive combinations 
of variables best describe the relationships. 
The assumption of uncorrelated independent variables is important 
in regression analysis. This assumption is necessary because regression 
coefficients are unstable when independent variables are intercorrelated; 
multicollinearity may distort actual relationships (Gordon, 1968). This 
assumption is not as critical in canonical analysis because variable 
weights are not tested for significance, and a variable's contribution 
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may be represented in other ways. In small or medium-sized samples, 
where variables within sets are highly intercorrelated, item-to-variate 
correlations have lower standard errors, and most accurately represent a 
variable's contribution to a relationship (Darlington et al., 1973:442). 
Multiple regression requires an interval-level dependent variable. 
In contrast, canonical correlation may employ nominal-level or dummy 
variables in either independent or dependent sets, or both (Darlington et 
al., 1973:439). In canonical analysis, variable sets may contain indica­
tors that are continuous, categorical, or mixed. Thus the data in this 
study meet the measurement assumptions of canonical correlation. 
The assumptions of canonical correlation are similar to those of re­
gression in that both develop variable weights according to a linear addi­
tive model. The canonical procedures permit a greater level of flexibil­
ity in combining levels of measurement, and are associated with strate­
gies to compensHce oi uxbLOLLxOLis sucuimxiig xircm muluj.collLncarj.ty• 
Hypothesis testing and interpretation 
Canonical correlation represents a test of the independence between 
two sets of variables. Wilks (1932) has defined the likelihood-ratio 
statistic L (lambda) for testing the null hypothesis that two sets are 
mutually independent, i.e., whether each variable in one set is uncorre-
lated with each variable in the other set. Bartlett (1941) has shown 
that a transformation of L approximates the chi-square distribution with 
(k x m) degrees of freedom; k and m are the number of variables in each 
set. The chi-square test is used ia this study Lo test hypotheses re­
lating sets of variables. If a second set of canonical variates is 
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generated, the degrees of freedom are [(k - 1) x (m - 1)]. 
Four major considerations may be identified in the evaluation of 
hypotheses linked to canonical correlation. These are: (1) the statis­
tical significance of the correlation; (2) the internal consistency of 
variates; (3) the direction of relationship; and (4) the existence of 
more than one significant set of canonical variates. 
Statistical significance Canonical correlations are associated 
with Wilks' lambda values that are mathematically transformed to chi-
square values to test hypotheses about the relationship between sets of 
variables. In this study, the transformed chi-square value will be re­
ported, and the .05 level of probability employed as a criterion for 
hypothesis testing. The actual probability value will be reported for 
each canonical correlation. The first set of canonical variates 
will be presented for all relationships; additional canonical factors 
will be reported only if they are significant at the .05 level. 
Internal consistency The variables in each set of indicators 
are argued to be multiple indicators of an abstract concept. The vari­
ables in each set should be consistently related to the composite of which 
they are weighted components. Item-to-variate correlations should be 
all positive, or all negative, but nevertheless, all in the same direc­
tion. Homogeneous item-to-variate correlations are particularly im­
portant within dependent variable sets. Sign reversals among independ­
ent variables, however, may be interpretable. 
Though all item-to-variate correlations may relate to the composite 
canonical variate in a consistent direction, variability may exist 
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in the strength of these correlations. Some indicators may be more 
heavily weighted in a relationship than others. The differential weight­
ing of component variables is a consideration in interpreting the mean­
ing of a canonical variate, and the nature of the relationship between 
two canonical variates. Cautious interpretation is warranted in situa­
tions where the number of variables is small and a dependent variable 
item-to-variate correlation is near zero. 
If consistent item-to-variate correlations are not present for a 
dependent variable, the canonical variate is uninterpretable and the 
hypothesis remains an open question. Interpretation can be supplied 
where inconsistencies exist only among independent variables. 
Direction of relationship The canonical correlation coefficient 
(R^) is a multiple correlation coefficient and is not associated with a 
sign indicating direction of relationship. The direction of relationship 
between two sets of indicators must be inferred by observing the item-co-
variate corrélations within each set. If both sets are positively signed, 
a positive relationship between sets can be inferred. If one set is 
negatively signed, and the other set of item-to-variate correlations 
is positively signed, a negative relationship can be said to exist between 
the variable sets (Darlington et al., 1973). Interpreting the direction 
of relationship is relevant only if the canonical correlation is signifi­
cant and the dependent variable set item-to-variate correlations are 
internally consistent. 
Multiple significant variates Canonical analysis may produce 
more than one set of statistically significant variates representing 
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the relationship between two sets of variables. The second canonical 
factor is based on analysis of the residual variance unexplained by the 
first factor, and the canonical correlation of the second set is always 
less than the first. Canonical variates in the second set are orthogonal 
(uncorrelated) with variates in the first set. 
Meyer and Younger (1974) argue that the existence of a second sig­
nificant canonical factor indicates that more than one source of common 
variation affects both sets of indicators. The resulting canonical 
correlation is an inconsistent estimate of the true relationship between 
the abstract concepts represented by each set, even though multiple di­
mensions of relationships may be substantively meaningful. When more 
than one dimension of shared variation is found to exist in a set, and 
the dependent variable is internally consistent, the second dimension 
may be interpreted. If the dependent variable is not internally consis­
tent, the relationship may De considered co be exLcaueous, ui due to 
some ccanmon source of error variance. 
By inspecting the internal consistency and strength of each canon­
ical correlation, inference can be cautiously made about the relationship 
between two sets of variables, and the meaning of additional dimensions 
of common variance. 
The existence of a second significant canonical factor may preclude 
accepting a hypothesis relating two sets of variables, particularly if 
dependent variates are deemed uninterpretable. 
Figure 3.2 shows the decision-matrix that will be employed in 
testing the hypotheses developed in Chapter II. The process can be 
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Statistically Significant Canonical Correlations 
Internally Consistent Variates Single Set of Variates 
Dependent Independent Yes No 
Yes 
Yes ACCEPT ACCEPT/ 
INTERPRET 
No ACCEPT/ 
INTERPRET 
ACCEPT/ 
INTERPRET 
No 
Yes REJECT REJECT 
No REJECT REJECT 
Figure 3.2. Hypothesis-test decision-matrix ror canonical 
correlation 
summarized as follows: (1) only statistically significant canonical 
variates will be considered; (2) internal consistency of variates will 
be examined; (3) the direction of relationship v/ill be determined by 
inspecting the signs or polarity of each variate; and (4) the nature 
and importance of any additional canonical factors will be considered. 
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Formation of composites 
The researcher is confronted with a dilemma when data analysis 
shifts from the relationship between sets of variables to simultaneous 
consideration of relationships among multiple sets of variables. Cooley 
and Lohnes (196 2:201) introduce procedures for multiple partial corre­
lations, but the technique is limited because it does not offer a means 
for assessing the significance of the independent effects of individual 
sets, nor of isolating these effects. Also, significance tests do not 
exist for the generalized partial canonical correlations produced by 
these procedures. 
A more frequently employed method of statistical control is regres-
sional analysis. Multiple independent variable sets can be analyzed in 
relation to a single composite dependent variable or in relation to each 
individual dependent variable. Where dependent variables are many, or 
represent multiple dimensions of a concept, individual analyses may be 
unwieldy, and composite variables present a distinct advantage. In this 
study, canonical variates are used as composites representing each inde­
pendent variable set. A linear, additive model will be assumed for con­
structing dependent variable composites for regression analysis. 
Additive model The additive model assumes that all the variables 
in a set are equally important. If the variables are not of equal metric 
or measurement scale, they require standardization prior to addition. 
Standardization is conversion of the original variables to z-scores. A 
z-score is the deviation of the raw score fron the mean expressed in 
standard deviation units. The formula for computing a z-score is: 
100 
2 = 2 ï. .  z-scores have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1. 
s 
The additive model for computing domain consensus and interdependence 
composites is; X = x,+x„+x„. The standardized scores are summed 
z zl z2 z3 
to form the ccmposite. 
The internal consistency reliability of the domain consensus composite 
was .46 (Cronbach, 1951). This is a low level of reliability, but little 
research has been devoted to measuring this concept, and it must be con­
sidered the best available. The interdependence composite demonstrated 
a reliability coefficient of .73, an acceptable level. 
Canonical variate A second method for computing composite vari­
ables in this study is that involving canonical correlations. Composite 
independent variables are a product of the canonical correlation pro­
cedures that tested the first nine hypotheses. These variates will be 
used as independent variables in regression equations. 
The model for deriving a canonical composite is: 
X = c.x , + c.x „ + c„x „ where c., c , and c„ are weights 
c 1 zl / zz J zj i / j 
derived in canonical correlation analysis. The standardized variables 
are multiplied by each weight to obtain the composite. 
Canonical variates will be employed ag independent variables in 
regression analyses in order to assess the individual and combined 
effects of comparative properties on domain consensus and interdepend­
ence. 
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Multiple regression 
Multiple regression analysis is a method of analyzing the collec­
tive and separate contributions of two or more independent variables 
to the variation of a single dependent variable (Kerlinger, 1973:3). 
The combined and incremental contribtuions of independent variables are 
major interests in this study. 
The composites formed through canonical correlation analysis will 
be employed as independent variables predicting composite domain con­
sensus and interdependence variables. The F-ratio is the appropriate 
statistic for examining the overall contribution of the independent vari-
2 
ables in explaining the dependent variable as indicated by the R , or 
total explained variance. The F-ratio is given by the following fomula: 
F . tR^'/k] 
[(l-R^)/(n-k-l)] 
2 R is the total explained variance, n is the sample size, and k is the 
number of independent variables (Kerlinger, 1973:63). 
Sequential F-tests will be employed to examine the incremental 
effects of particular canonical variates. Sequential F-tests conpare 
full and reduced regression models. The full model contains the vari-
able(s) of interest and the control variable(s)» The reduced model con­
tains only the control variable(s). The sequential F-test is as follows: 
F = (Kerlinger, 1973:71). 
[(l-R^)/(n-k^-l)] 
The sequential F-test answers the following question: Does the addition 
of a variable or variables add significantly to the regression or the 
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prediction? 
2 
Calculating incremental R s and using the sequential F-test to 
evaluate them enables the researcher to assess the relative efficacies 
of different variables in the regression equation. In this study, se­
quential F-tests will be used to assess the independent effect of can-
parative properties on domain consensus and interdependence, and the re­
lationship between domain consensus and interdependence controlling 
comparative properties. 
The multiple regression analyses test three related sets of empiri­
cal hypotheses. The first set refers to the overall combined effect of 
composite comparative property variates on each dependent variable; 
the second set to the sequential or incremental effects of comparative 
properties, controlling for the alternate type of integration; and 
finally, hypotheses specifying the incremental effect of each type of 
integration, controlling the comparative properties. 
Combined effect These hypotheses test the ccaibined effect of 
comparative properties on the dependent variable by applying the F-test 
to the total variance explained in each dependent variable. 
The direct effect hypotheses are: 
E.H. 10.1; Comparative properties together predict domain 
consensus. 
E.H. 11.1: Conparative properties together predict inter­
dependence. 
Integration controlled The combined effects of comparative 
properties after the alternate type of integration is in the equation 
are specified in the next two empirical hypotheses. Domain consensus 
D O M A I N  
C O N S E N S U S  
C O M P A R A T  I V E  
P R O P E R T I E S  
INTERDEPENDENCE 
Figure 3.3. Diagtsuii of hypotheslzeil control relationships 
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and interdependence are employed as control variables to assess the 
combined independent effect of the comparative properties. 
E.H. 10.2: Comparative properties together predict domain 
consensus controlling interdependence. 
E.H. 11.2: Comparative properties together predict inter­
dependence controlling domain consensus. 
Comparative properties controlled These hypotheses refer to 
the effects of domain consensus and interdependence on each other, after 
the comparative properties are in the equation. A sequential F-test 
examines the increment of explained variance associated with each type of 
integration. 
E.H. 12.1: Interdependence predicts domain consensus controlling 
comparative properties. 
E.H. 12.2: Demain consensus predicts interdependence controlling 
comparative properties. 
Methodological comparison It is of some interest to compare 
the results of canonical correlation to the results obtained in regres­
sion with canonical variates, and both to results obtained in block regres­
sion analysis. Block regression analysis enters a set of variables as 
a group, and the effect of the group is reflected in the multiple cor­
relation coefficient. Canonical correlation coefficients and multiple 
correlation coefficients are directly comparable. The comparisons 
should show the three types of results to be similar in magnitude and 
significance. Based on these comparisons, some observations will be 
made on the utility of the canonical correlation approach and the use of 
canonical variates in regression analysis. 
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CHAPTER IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
The objective of this chapter is to test the hypotheses developed 
in Chapter II. Each of the first nine hypotheses will be examined in the 
order in which they were presented. Domain consensus and interdepend­
ence will be examined first, then each will be examined in relation to 
the four sets of comparative properties. After each relationship has 
been discussed, the overall results of the canonical analyses will be re­
viewed and summarized. 
Regression analysis will be used to examine the independent effect 
of each set of comparative properties. The composites developed in 
canonical analysis will be employed as independent variables and used to 
predict composite domain consensus and interdependence variables. Re­
gression analysis will be used to examine the last six empirical hypoth­
eses described in Chapter III. A final secLiun will couipaLe Llïe ïcsults 
obtained in canonical correlation to alternative regression approaches. 
Bivariate correlations and ccsnplete regression results are available in 
the Appendix. 
Canonical Correlation Analysis 
This section presents the canonical correlations corresponding to 
each hypothesized relationship, as well as item-to-canonical variate 
correlations, and significance levels. The hypotheses will be evaluated 
according to the procedures described in Chapter III. 
106 
Domain consensus and interdependence 
General Hypothesis 1_ The relational property of domain consen­
sus is related to the relational property of interdependence. 
Empirical Hypothesis 1.1 The set of demain consensus variables 
is related to the set of interdependence variables. The hypothesis was 
initially evaluated by applying the chi-square test to the canonical 
correlation, which is equal to .369 (Bartlett, 1941). The chi-square 
of 25.75 with 9 degrees of freedom was significant at the .002 level of 
probability (Table 4.1). Inspecting the item-to-variate correlations, 
each set was internally consistent in sign. The hypothesis relating do­
main consensus and interdependence variables was accepted. 
The negative signs associated with the interdependence variables in­
dicated a negative relationship between sets. Because canonical corre­
lations are always positive, the direction of relationship must be in­
ferred fron the signs attached to the elements in the canonical variaces 
(Darlington et al., 1973). It was concluded that domain consensus was 
negatively related to interdependence. 
The pattern of item-to-variate correlations indicated that the 
domain consensus variate predominantly represented the domain variable 
related to scenic river development (Domain^), followed by the feedlot 
construction variable (DomaiUg). The housing development variable 
(Domain^) was of lesser importance in this relationship. The interde­
pendence variate predominantly represented resource exchange, and almost 
equally represented joint programs and information exchange. 
The negative relationship found between domain consensus and 
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Table 4.1. Item-to-variate correlations and canonical correlation 
between domain consensus variables and interdependence 
variables 
Variable sets Item-to-variate correlations 
I II 
Domain consensus 
Domain^ 
Domain^ 
Domain^ 
Interdependence 
.111 
.583 
.926 
no additional 
canonical factors 
were generated at 
the .05 level of 
significance 
Joint programs 
Resource exchange 
Information exchange 
-.344 
-.974 
.320 
Canonical correlation R .369 
Eiftêiwalue R 
Chi-square 
Degrees of freedom 
Probability 
25.750 
9 
.002 
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and interdependence is contrary to most previous theory and research on 
this relationship, though some previous research implicitly anticipates 
this finding. Warren (1974) found relatively low levels of specific 
domain consensus between pairs of organizations. He argued that the 
agencies in his study relied on a broader interorganizational consensus, 
on the values and norms of interorganizational behavior, to provide a 
framework for working out domain problems. Agencies in this study also 
may rely on a broader value consensus to support the contingencies of 
interdependent working relationships. 
These results suggest that the more intensive the interdependence 
in a dyad, the greater the discrepancies in mutual expectations regard­
ing domain. Agencies that work together are more likely to possess 
broader expectations and awarenesses of each other's potential for ac­
tion or involvement. However, the expectations held by outsiders for 
an organization's involvement in a given problem may not be offset by a 
counteracting familiarity with an organization's workload capacity, 
budget limitations, or lack of administrative authorization to act in 
certain situations. Administrators may be more cautious in committing 
their own agency's limited resources to additional involvements than 
they are in their expectations for the involvements of other groups. 
These ideas are supported in part by the finding that administrators 
assigned a mean rating of 2.9 to their own involvement across situations, 
and a mean rating of 3.0 to the expected involvement of other groups, on 
a five-point scale. Administrators tended to expect more from other 
agencies than they were willing to commit their own groups to. 
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The negative relationship between domain consensus and interdepend­
ence may be explained in part by the tendency of agencies to rate the 
involvement of outside groups as greater than their own, and to increase 
their expectations for another group if they are more familiar with its 
activities and potential. 
The findings also are contrary to the arguments of functional integra­
tion theory that stated that normative and functional integration are 
positively interrelated processes. In this study normative integration, 
defined in terms of domain consensus, was negatively related to functional 
integration. The degree of interdependence between agencies was not re­
lated to share definitions of each other's activities, but in fact, dif­
ferences were magnified the more intensive the contacts between groups. 
As organizations become more involved in each other's activities, their 
own outside perspectives may be manifested in divergent expectations 
over how another organization should accomplish its tasks, or wnar it is 
capable of doing. If indeed ties of interdependence are transitional 
replacements of ties based on common values, increasing interdependence 
may allow greater divergencies in perspective to exist between groups. 
Interdependence may generate expectations on matters that would no*-
ordinarily be exposed to outside influence. The resulting dissensus 
over domain may be tolerated because the relationship may be an estab­
lished linkage directed by law or authority, or one that has come to be 
expected by the consumers of both organization's services. Thus the op­
tion to reduce interaction even though dissensus is present may not be 
available. 
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When organizations are interdependent, each is more involved in the 
other's affairs. The findings show that mutual expectations increasingly 
diverge as organizations increase their mutual involvements, and that 
mutual expectations tend to converge with Imver levels of interdepend­
ence. 
Two interpretations were offered for the theoretical relationship 
between domain consensus and interdependence. One argued that domain 
consensus is an antecedent condition of interdependence, the other, that 
domain consensus is coextensive with interdependence. Both conditions 
may very well apply to the relationship, but domain consensus was nega­
tively related to interdependence in this study. A common general defini­
tion of mutual activities may be important for initial interaction, but 
more intensive relationships may generate differences based on each 
organization's own interests and perspectives. Familiarity appeared to 
lead to dissensus over domain among the organizations in this study. 
In addition, domain consensus and interdependence may be negatively 
coextensive, that is, changes in one may produce concomitant changes 
in the other. More intensive interdependence blurs organizational 
boundaries and may create dissensus over domain^ A decrease in inter­
dependence may involve the establishment of new limits and distance be­
tween groups, and increase the level of domain consensus. 
Though interdependence may complicate shared definitions of domain, 
the mutual investment in the relationship is an assurance that specific 
issues will be resolved in orderly manner when they arise. One inter­
pretation of the findings suggests that domain consensus may be initially 
I l l  
important for interdependence, but more intensive relations between 
groups may activate latent expectations for domain, creating less specific 
domain consensus. Disagreements over domain are then resolved in the 
context of shared commitment to the relationship, 
Organi zational output and domain consensus 
General Hypothesis 2 The comparative property of shared organ­
izational output is related to the relational property of domain con­
sensus. 
Empirical Hypothesis 2.1 The set of organizational output vari­
ables is related to the set of domain consensus variables. The canonical 
correlation between these sets is .362 and is significant at the .03 
level of probability (Table 4.2). The item-to-variate correlations, 
though not entirely consistent within the organizational output variable, 
indicated a negative relationship between shared organizational output 
and domain consensus. The hypothesis relating organizational output and 
demain consensus was accepted. 
Although item-to-variate correlations were not entirely consistent 
within the set of organizational output variables, the inconsistent cor­
relations were close to zero, and therefore, the variatc was interpreted 
to represent an overall dimension of shared organizational output. Tech­
nical assistance and information assistance were minimal components of 
this factor. Cost-sharing and financial assistance were most heavily 
represented; dyads that shared these services tended to have lower levels 
of domain consensus. Organizations that offered these services may have 
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Table 4.2. Item-to-variate correlations and canonical correlation 
between organizational output variables and domain 
consensus variables 
Variable sets Item-to-variate correlations 
I II 
Organizational output 
Regulatory 
Cost-sharing 
Technical assistance 
Planning assistance 
Information assistance 
Financial assistance 
Management-development 
-.293 
-.761 
.075 
-.216 
.078 
-.585 
-.239 
no additional 
canonical factors 
were generated at 
the .05 level of 
significance 
Demain consensus 
Domain^ 
Domaint 
.238 
= 501 
.964 
Canonical correlation R 
2 
Eigenvalue R 
.362 
.131 
Chi-square 
Degrees of freedom 
Probability 
34.505 
21 
.032 
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more narrowly defined their activities to the application of funds, while 
other groups may have had higher expectations of their involvement. 
Dissensus also may stem from outsider expectations that confined 
these groups to their specific cost-sharing and financial assistance 
activities, and did not anticipate the involvements that administrators 
projected for their own groups. 
Organizations that are involved in the delivery of similar types of 
services are more likely to be aware of each other's activities and to 
have expectations about another's involvements in various problem areas. 
Because administrators may tend to expect more from other groups than 
from their own, the greatest deviations in expectation occurred among 
those with whom they were most closely associated and aware; organiza­
tions that shared similar services. 
It was argued that similar goals and functions foster a division of 
labor between organizations. This was not found to be the case. Organ­
izations that shared services, particularly those related to the dis­
bursement and application of funds were associated with lower levels of 
demain consensus. Organizations that shared services were more likely to 
have discrepant mutual expectations about domain than organizations 
that offered different services. 
Organizational output and interdependence 
General Hypothesis 2 The comparative property of shared organ­
izational output is related to the relational property of interdepend­
ence. 
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Empirical Hypothesis 3.1 The set of organizational output vari­
ables is related to the set of interdependence variables. The canonical 
correlation of .636 was significant at the .0001 level and the hypoth­
esis was supported (Table 4.3). The item-to-variate correlations were 
consistent within the dependent set, and were generally consistent within 
the organizational output variate. 
The technical assistance variable was inconsistently correlated 
within the organizational output variables. Due to its small magnitude, 
however, this inconsistency was discounted and the global hypothesis 
accepted. The remaining correlations generally indicated that organiza­
tions which shared a particular type of output are more likely to be inter­
dependent than those who did not share common outputs. 
The theoretical argument of Reid (1969) is supported by these find­
ings. Organizations with similar function may be more interdependent be­
cause of similar resource needs. Similar activities and service concerns 
increase the likelihood that a common basis for interaction will be en­
countered. In addition, organizations that share similar services also 
may share similar goals. Their activities may more readily become inter­
dependent because of the potential increase in mutual goal attainment 
that may be obtained through interrelated effort. 
Output constituency and domain consensus 
General Hypothesis 4 The comparative property of shared output 
constituency is related to the relational property of domain consensus. 
Empirical Hypothesis 4.1 The set of output constituency vari­
ables is related to the set of demain consensus variables. The 
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Table 4.3. Item-to-variate correlations and canonical correlation 
between organizational output variables and interdepen­
dence variables 
Variable sets Item-to-variate correlations 
I II 
Organizational output 
Regulatory 
Cost-sharing 
Technical assistance 
Planning assistance 
Information assistance 
Financial assistance 
Management-development 
.043 
.704 
-.157 
.338 
.184 
.670 
.528 
no additional 
canonical variâtes 
were generated at 
the .05 level of 
significance 
Interdependence 
Joint programs 
Resource exchange 
Information exchange 
.366 
.979 
.345 
Canonical correlation R 
2 ^ 
Eigenvalue R 
.636 
.404 
Chi-square 
Degrees of freedcm 
Probability 
93.332 
21 
.0001 
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canonical correlation of .348 is not significant and the hypothesis 
cannot be accepted (Table 4.4). The shared output constituency variable 
set is not related to domain consensus. 
The domain consensus variate was internally consistent, while dif­
ferent types of client groups received different weights in the output 
constituency variate. Agencies that provided services to farmers and 
local agencies tended to have a higher level of demain consensus than 
those who provided services to recreational users and nonfarm landowners. 
The relationship is not, however, supported by the canonical correlation. 
Expectations the organizations held of each other's activities were 
not affected by the sharing of client groups. The previous finding, 
however, suggests that the kinds of services shared, particularly those 
involving the distribution of funds, are important considerations for 
domain consensus. 
Output constituency and interdependence 
General Hypothesis 5 The comparative property of shared output 
constituency is related to the relational property of interdependence. 
Empirical Hypothesis 5.1 The set of output constituency vari­
ables is related to the seL ol iu'cerdeperidence variables. The canonical 
correlation of .552 was significant at the .0001 level (Table 4.5). The 
hypothesis relating output constituency variable to interdependence was 
accepted. 
A second set of canonical variates also were significantly related 
by a canonical correlation of .473. The presence of a second canonical 
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Table 4.4. Item-to-variate correlations and canonical correlation 
between output constituency variables and domain 
consensus variables 
Variable sets Item-to-variate correlations 
I II 
Output constituency 
Farmers 
Private industry 
Recreational users 
Nonfarm landowners 
Park-users 
Homeowners 
Local agencies 
.464 
.001 
.279 
-.110 
.087 
-.053 
.256 
no additional 
canonical factors 
were generated at 
the .05 level of 
significance 
Domain consensus 
Domain^ .280 
Domain^ .860 
Doinaiii^ .711 
Canonical correlation R .348 
2 ^ 
Eigenvalue R^ .121 
Chi-square 26.677 
Degrees of freedom 21 
Probability .182 
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Table 4.5. Item-to-variate correlations and canonical correlation 
between output constituency variables and interdependence 
variables 
Variable sets Item-to-variate correlations 
I II 
Output constituency 
Farmers 
Private industry 
Recreational users 
Nonfarm landowners 
Park-users 
Homeowners 
Local agencies 
.360 
,241 
.246 
,362 
.072 
.235 
.272 
.595 
.409 
.414 
.628 
.074 
.246 
.717 
Interdependence 
Joint programs 
Resource exchange 
Information exchange 
.123 
.957 
.439 
.891 
.273 
.054 
Canonical correlation R 
2 c 
Eigenvalue R 
.552 
.305 
.473 
.223 
Chi-square 
Degrees of freedom 
Probability 
90.825 
.0001 
39.730 
12 
.0001 
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factor does not preclude accepting the empirical hypothesis because both 
interdependence variates were internally consistent, though the first 
variate emphasized resource exchange, and the second joint programming. 
The first output constituency variate weighted the output constitu­
encies of farmers, recreational users, and local agencies; it negatively 
weighted private industry, nonfarm landowners, and homeowners. Provid­
ing services to farmers, recreational users, and agencies was a central 
cluster of outputs associated with interdependence among the agencies in 
this study, while those that shared industrial and nonfarm client groups 
tended to have lower levels of interdependence. 
The second factor may represent shared client groups in general, the 
effects of which are residual to serving particular types of client groups. 
This variate was associated with higher item-to-variate correlations, 
indicating that the effects of individual variables were more clearly 
represented by the factor. Sharing other local agencies, nonfarm land­
owners, and farmers were the most important aspects of this variate, 
while sharing park-users as a client groups was minimally important. 
Thus two variates appear to explain the relationship between shared 
output constituency variables and interdependence. The first variate 
identified specific clusters of output constituencies and was related to 
an interdependence variate stressing resource exchange as a central 
component. The second output constituency variate reflected a more gen­
eral dimension of sharing client groups, and was significantly related to 
an interdependence variate stressing joint programming. 
The findings are consistent with the argument that sharing particular 
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types of client groups may produce pressures for interdependence, as 
well as increasing the likelihood that a common basis for interdepend­
ence will be encountered. 
Sharing certain types of clients seems to be most important for 
determining resource exchange among organizations, while sharing client 
groups in general seems to be most important for determining more struc­
tured forms of interdependence, such as joint programming. 
Decision-making and domain consensus 
General Hypothesis 6 The comparative property of organizational 
decision-making is related to the relational property of domain consensus. 
Empirical Hypothesis 6.1 The set of decision-making variables 
is related to the set of domain consensus variables. The canonical cor­
relation of .308 was significant at the .02 level (Table 4.6). The sixth 
hypothesis relating decision-making variables to dmiain consensus can 
be accepted. 
The decision-making variate most heavily weighted differences in 
autonomy, though formalization differences and shared decision-making 
context were also important. The domain consensus variate was predomi­
nantly represented by the first domain variable, giving near zero weights 
to the remainder. The pattern of weighting reflected some degree of 
distortion in the representation of the dependent variables and the re­
lationship must be cautiously interpreted. 
Domain consensus was related to differences in the way decision­
making processes were constrained within each organization. Organiza­
tions that were different in their level of autonomy and level of 
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Table 4.6. Item-to-variate correlations and canonical correlation 
between decision-making variables and domain consensus 
Variable sets Item-to-variate correlations 
I II 
Decision-making 
Formalization 
Autonomy 
Context 
.322 
.805 
.416 
no additional 
canonical factors 
were generated at 
the .05 level of 
significance 
Domain consensus 
Domain^ 
Domain^ 
Domain. 
.964 
-.073 
.198 
Canonical correlation R 
2 ^ 
Eigenvalue R 
.308 
.095 
Chi-square 
Degrees of freedom 
Probability 
19.657 
9 
.020 
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formalization, but shared a ccmnnon authority structure, had the highest 
domain consensus. The presence of one highly structured member in a 
dyad appeared to be conducive for establishing domain expectations in 
the relationship; low autonomy and high autonomy agencies tended to have 
higher levels of domain consensus. 
Organizations with similar decision-making structures tended to have 
lower levels of domain consensus. Administrators tended to have less 
congruent expectations with groups that were similar to their own. The 
results may reflect differences in the relative abilities of agencies to 
anticipate each other's constraints and capabilities, as well as the 
tendency of administrators to distinguish their own agency's activities 
from the activities of similar groups. 
General Hypothesis !_ The comparative property of organizational 
decision-making is related to interdependence. 
Empirical Hypothesis 7.1 The set of decision-making variables 
is related to the set of interdependence variables. The canonical 
correlation of .601 is associated with a probability of ,001 (Table 4.7). 
A significant relationship was found between the set of decisionmaking 
variables the set of interdependence variables. 
The interdependence variate was internally consistent, though joint 
programming and information exchange were most heavily weighted. The 
decision-making variate largely represented the inclusive decision-making 
context variable, and the weightings of formalization and autonomy dif­
ferences were minimized» Other aspects of decision-making had little 
effect on the intensity of relationships among the agencies in this study. 
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Table 4.7. Item-to-variate correlations and canonical correlation 
betwçen decisionmaking variables and interdependence 
variables 
Variable sets Item-to-variate correlations 
I II 
Decision-making 
Formalization 
Autonomy 
Context 
.024 
.126 
.929 
no additional 
canonical factors 
were generated at 
the .05 level of 
significance 
Interdependence 
Joint programs 
Resource exchange 
Information exchange 
.927 
.543 
.782 
Canonical correlation R 
2 ^ 
Eigenvalue R 
.601 
.361 
Chi-square 
Degrees of freedom 
Probability 
71.918 
9 
.0001 
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An important conclusion is that interdependence most frequently 
occurred among agencies that shared a common authority structure. A 
shared authority structure provides a context for decision-making in 
which interdependence may be more readily legitimized, and in some cases, 
formally structured as part of the agencies' regular activities. Such 
interdependence may be encouraged and supported by higher administrative 
levels; it is also less likely to constitute a threat to each agency's 
activities or structure of resource allocations. 
Though decision-making context was very important, the arguments 
for formalization and autonomy were not supported by the findings. Dif­
ferences in the amount and nature of decision-making that was available 
to administrators was of little importance in determining interdepend­
ence. A ccsnmon authority appears to legitimize, support, and enforce a 
large part of the interdependence that occurred among the organizations 
in this study. 
Decision-maker characteristics and domain consensus 
General Hypothesis 8 The comparative property of decision-maker 
characteristics is related to the relational property of domain consensus. 
Empirical Hypotheses 8.1 The set of decision-maker variables is 
related to the set of demain consensus variables. The canonical corre­
lation between decision-maker variables and domain consensus was .236, 
but was not statistically significant (Table 4.8). Decision-maker charac­
teristics were not related to domain consensus, and the hypothesis was 
not accepted. 
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Table 4.8, Item-to-variate correlations and canonical correlation 
between decision-maker variables and domain consensus 
Variable sets Item-to-variate correlations 
I II 
Decision-maker 
Tenure 
Professional activity 
Education 
Age 
- .464 
.156 
.695 
.475 
no additional 
canonical factors 
were generated at 
the .05 level of 
significance 
Domain consensus 
Domain, 
Domain^ 
Domain^ 
.218 
-.793 
.314 
Canonical correlation R 
2 c 
Eigenvalue R 
.236 
.056 
Chi-square 
Degrees of freedom 
Probability 
14.773 
12 
.254 
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The domain consensus variate was internally inconsistent. The de­
cision-maker variate negatively weighted differences in tenure, and posi­
tively weighted educational and age differences. Professional activity 
was not an important aspect of this factor. 
No identifiable pattern of relationship emerged between the deci­
sion-maker variables and demain consensus. The characteristics of boundary 
personnel appeared to have little affect on mutual expectations for in­
volvement among the organizations in this study. 
Decision-maker characteristics and interdependence 
General Hypothesis 9_ The comparative property of decision-maker 
characteristics is related to the relational property of interdependence. 
Empirical Hypothesis 9.1 The set of decision-maker variables 
is related to the set of interdependence variables. The canonical correla­
tion of ,279 was not statistically significant (Table 4.9). The hypoth­
esis relating decision-maker characteristics to interdependence cannot 
be accepted. 
The interdependence factor was internally consistent. The decision­
maker variate negatively weighted professional activity differences, 
and positively weighted age differences. 
Differences in age appeared to facilitate relations between groups, 
and differences in professionalism to impede the processes of interde­
pendence. However, tenure and education differences were of little im­
portance, and the overall relationship was not significant. 
Previous research has shown professionalism to be an important aspect 
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Table 4.9. Item-to-variate correlations and canonical correlation 
between decision-maker variables and interdependence 
variables 
Variable sets Item-to-variate correlations 
I II 
Decision-maker 
Tenure 
Professional activity 
Education 
Age 
.130 
-.899 
.081 
.470 
no additional 
canonical variates 
were generated at 
the .05 level of 
significance 
Interdependence 
Resource exchange 
Information exchange 
.885 
.490 
.840 
Canonical correlation R 
2 ^ 
Eigenvalue R 
.279 
.078 
Chi-square 
Degrees of freedom 
Probability 
14.541 
12 
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of relations between organizations. The canonical variate weighting 
shows it to be an important aspect of the relationship, but because the 
other variables had little effect, the overall relationship did not 
account for a significant proportion of variation between sets. 
Summary of canonical correlations 
Figure 4.1 diagrams the statistically significant canonical correla­
tions associated with the first nine hypotheses. The domain consensus and 
interdependence variable sets were negatively related. Shared organiza­
tional output was negatively related to domain consensus; but was posi­
tively related to interdependence. Shared output constituency was re­
lated only to interdependence. Two dimensions of relationship were 
found. One reflected clusters of different types of services, and a sec­
ond reflected shared client groups in general. Decision-making proper­
ties were related to domain consensus; they also were strongly related 
to interdependence. Decision-maker characteristics were not related to 
either dependent variable set. In general, the comparative properties 
were most strongly related to interdependence. 
The next section examines empirical hypotheses related to the over­
all and independent effects of the comparative properties and the two 
dependent variables. Multiple regression analysis will be used to assess 
the last six empirical hypotheses. 
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Figure U.l Hypothesized relationships supported by canonical correlations 
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Regression Analysis 
This section examines the last three general hypotheses developed 
in Chapter II, The composites formed for each set of independent vari­
ables in the preceding canonical analysis will be employed as independent 
variables in multiple regression analysis= Composite domain consensus 
variables and interdependence variables will be regressed on canonical 
variate composites representing each set of independent variables. Sig­
nificant F-ratios are hypothesized, and the independent effects of each 
composite variate may be observed in sequential multiple correlation 
coefficients. 
The canonical analysis of organizational output and interdependence 
identified two dimensions of common variance between sets. For the 
purposes of regression analysis, these two variates will be considered 
together ; only their combined effects presented. 
The six empirical hypothesis will each be presented and evaluated. 
A discussion will follow interpreting the overall pattern of relation­
ships among domain consensus, interdependence and comparative properties. 
Multiple regression analysis - domain consensus 
General Hypothesis 10 The organizational output, output consti­
tuency, decision-making, and decision-maker comparative properties together 
predict the relational property of domain consensus. 
Empirical Hypothesis 10.1 The comparative properties together 
predict domain consensus. The combined comparative property composite 
variables explained ib.4 percent of the domain consensus variance, a 
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statistically significant ;anount (Table 4.10). The empirical hypothesis 
was accepted. 
Empirical Hypothesis 10.2 The comparative properties predict 
domain consensus controlling interdependence. Table 4.10 shows the incre­
mental explained variance of .126 associated with the comparative proper­
ties after the interdependence variate is entered in the regression 
equation. The comparative properties made a significant contribution 
after interdependence and the hypothesis was accepted. 
In addition, the combined effects of the comparative properties and 
interdependence explained 21 percent of the demain consensus variance. 
The results show that the combined comparative properties made signifi­
cant independent and incremental contributions to the explanation of 
demain consensus variance, though only a relatively small proportion of 
the overall domain consensus variance was accounted for. 
Multiple regression analysis - interdependence 
General Hypothesis 11 The organizational output, output, con­
stituency, decision-making and decision-maker comparative properties 
together predict the relational property of interdependence. 
Empirical Hypothesis 11.1 The comparative properties together 
predict interdependence. Table 4.10 shows the regression of composite 
comparative properties variables on interdependence. The combined com­
parative properties explained 47.2 percent of the interdependence vari­
ance, a significant amount. The empirical hypothesis was accepted. 
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Table 4.10. Multiple regression results showing combined and incre­
mental effects of comparative properties on domain consen­
sus and interdependence 
Relationship 
Multiple regression results 
Explained 
(r2) 
variance 
Multiple 
(R) 
correlation 
F-value 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Domain consensus 
Combined effect of 
comparative properties 
on domain consensus ,184 
Incremental effect of 
comparative properties 
on domain consensus 
controlling interde­
pendence .126 
Combined effect of 
comparative properties 
and interdependence on 
domain consensus .210 
.429 
.429 
.459 
7.932 
*** 
4/141 
5.582 
*** 
7.46 
4/140 
5/140 
Combined effect of 
comparative properties 
on interdependence .472 
Incremental effect of 
comparative properties 
on interdependence con­
trolling domain con­
sensus .432 
Combined effect of 
comparative properties 
and domain consensus 
on interdependence .495 
.687 25.008 
*** 
5/140 
.450 23.781 
*** 
.703 22.681 
*** 
5/139 
6/139 
***p < .001 level. 
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Empirical Hypothesis 11.2 The comparative properties together 
predict interdependence controlling domain consensus. The incremental 
explained variance associated with the combined comparative properties 
was .432, a statistically significant proportion (Table 4.10). The hy­
pothesis relating comparative properties to interdependence controlling 
domain consensus was accepted. 
In addition, the combined effects of the ccmparative properties and 
demain consensus explained 49.5 percent of the interdependence variance, 
a statistically significant amount (Table 4.10). The combined compara­
tive properties made both independent and incremental contributions to 
the explained interdependence variance, showing comparative properties 
to be a major factor in explaining interdependence. 
Multiple regression analysis - controlling comparative properties 
GAneral Hypothesis 12 Domain consensus is related to interde­
pendence, controlling comparative properties. 
Empirical Hypothesis 12.1 Interdependence predicts domain con­
sensus controlling comparative properties. Entering interdependence 
after the comparative properties produced an incremental explained vari­
ance of .027 (Table 4.11). The interdependence variate significantly 
added to the prediction of domain consensus after comparative properties, 
and the empirical hypothesis was accepted. 
Empirical Hypothesis 12.2 Demain consensus predicts interde­
pendence controlling comparative properties. Regressing the domain con­
sensus composite variate on interdependence after the comparative proper­
ties was associated with an incremental explained variance of .023 
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Table 4.11. Multiple regression results showing incremental effects of 
domain consensus and interdependence, after comparative 
properties 
Multiple regression results 
Relationship Explained Multiple Degrees of 
(R^) (R) F-value freedom 
variance correlation 
Incremental effect of 
interdependence on 
domain consensus 
controlling com- * 
parative properties .027 .030 4.78 1/140 
Incremental effect of 
domain consensus on 
interdependence con­
trolling comparative ^ 
properties .023 .016 6.33 1/139 
*p < .05 level. 
**p < .01 level. 
(Table 4.11). Domain consensus significantly predicted interdependence 
after the comparative properties and the hypothesis was accepted. 
The results showed domain consensus and interdependence to have con­
current effects on one another. Controlling the ccmbined comparative 
properties did not completely explain away the relationship, though they 
accounted for a substantial part of it. 
Discussion 
Domain consensus The regression analysis showed that compara­
tive properties were the major determinants of domain consensus. The 
comparative properties predicted domain consensus as a group ; they also 
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predicted domain consensus when controlling for interdependence. Inter­
dependence had a small but statistically significant effect on domain 
consensus after the comparative properties. Figure 4.2 diagrams the 
relationships supported in regression analysis. 
Three sources of variation were found to be important in explaining 
domain consensus. The comparative properties explained 12.6 percent of 
domain consensus variance after interdependence; interdependence ex­
plained 2.7 percent after the comparative properties; comparative proper­
ties and interdependence overlapped 6.7 percent in explaining domain con­
sensus variance (12.6 + 2.7 + 6.7 = 21.0). Comparative properties and 
interdependence together explained 21.0 percent of the domain consensus 
variance. In conclusion, the comparative properties had the most impor­
tant independent effects on domain consensus, even after the fact that 
more were represented. 
Domain consensus appeared to be largely an outcome of the structural 
conditions that bring organizations together. Comparative properties 
strongly determined the impact one organization's activity had on another. 
Organizations with similar domains and similar decision-making structures 
appeared to be more likely to encounter each other's presence in the course 
of their regular activities. The data showed that increased proximity 
of organizations was associated with less domain consensus; the intensity 
of relations between groups explained a small amount of this variation, 
the majority stemmed from structural conditions of similarity and differ­
ences between interacting groups. 
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Interdependence The regression analyses show that both the com­
parative properties and domain consensus had independent effects on inter­
dependence. The comparative properties independently explained 43.2 
percent of the interdependence variance; domain consensus independently 
explained 2.3 percent of the interdependence variance. The comparative 
properties and domain consensus shared an overlapping variance of 4 per­
cent in predicting interdependence. The comparative properties and domain 
consensus together explained 49.5 percent of the interdependence variance 
(43.2 + 2.3 + 4 = 49.5). 
These findings show the ccmparative properties to be very important 
determinants of interdependence, as well as of domain consensus. Com­
parative properties played an important role in predicting both types of 
integration in interorganizational relationships. 
Common expectations about domain may be important in establishing 
relationships between groups. The findings show that deviations in 
specific expectations about domain increase as organizations become more 
interdependent. There is more variability in mutual expectations over 
domain as organizations increase the intensity of their involvements with 
one another. Groups then have greater mutual awareness of each other's 
interests and activities; they are more likely to develop sets of expecta-
iLcns for each other based on their own interests. The shared activities 
of interdependence, however, provide a framework or context for the 
divergent expectations to exist, and they may become sources of innova­
tion in the relationship. 
Large deviations in expectation also may be a source of conflicts, 
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but the shared investment in interdependence is an incentive to resolve 
the conflicts. Another form of conflict resolution is to lessen the 
interdependence, thus drawing new boundaries between organizations and 
creating new domain consensus. 
These results have implications for the question of the ordering of 
domain consensus and interdependence. Both domain consensus and interde­
pendence exert independent effects on one another, controlling for the 
comparative property variates. If one or the other relationship had van­
ished under control for comparative properties, it might have been argued 
that the remaining relationship was a causal one, i.e., it remained after 
control for comparative properties. If both relationships had vanished, 
it might have argued that the link between relational properties was due 
to common structural conditions and they actually had little independent 
effect on one another. However, the findings of this study suggest 
that domain consensus and interdependence are coextensive; each had a 
part in determining the other. Comparative properties are a context in 
which relationships occur. The properties of these relationships have 
independent effects on each other, even though they are largely deter­
mined by the structural conditions of similarities and differences. Ex­
pectations about domain play a role in initiating and maintaining inter­
dependence; the ensuing transactions also have an impact on domain con­
sensus. 
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Methodological comparison 
This section compares canonical correlations and multiple correla­
tion coefficients obtained in two ways: Regressing canonical variates 
on composite dependent variables, and regressing original variable sets 
on composite dependent variables. Canonical variate composites are 
weighted sums obtained in canonical correlation analysis; the dependent 
variables are unweighted sums of standardized variables. 
Reading across Table 4.12, canonical coefficients are always larger 
than the multiple correlation coefficients, reflecting the relationship-
maximizing function of the technique. However, the significance levels 
of the canonical correlations are almost always equal or less than the 
multiple correlation coefficients from regression. 
Canonical correlations are tested for statistical significance 
according to the Chi-square distribution. The Chi-square values are 
referenced to the number of degrees of freedom obtained by taking the 
product of the number of variables in the first set time the number of 
variables in the second set. As the number of variables increase, canoni­
cal significance tests become more conservative at a much faster rate 
than do regression F-ratio tests, which are referenced to number of in­
dependent variables. Thus the canonical correlations were always great­
est in magnitude, but they had compensating, more stringent statistical 
standards to meet. 
The coefficient based on canonical variate composites were always 
smaller in magnitude than the other coefficients, but were associated 
with higher levels of statistical significance. The variates were tested 
Table 4.12. Summary comparison of canonical correlation coefficients and multiple correlation 
coefficients obtained in regression on canonical variates and on original variable 
sets: Results for domain consensus and interdependence 
Canonical variate 
Domain consensus Interdependence 
Canonical Composite Set Canonical Composite Set 
Organizational output .362 ,299 
*** 
.325 .636 
*** *** *** 
.444 .471 
Output constituency .348 , 282  
*** 
.312 .552 
*** *** *** 
.420 .433 
Decision-making properties ,308 ,163 .182 ,601 
*** 
,560 .565 
Decision-maker characteristics .236 .030 .094 ,279 
*** * 
,256 .260 
Domain consensus 
*** *** * 
,369 .259 .274 
Interdependence 
** * 
.369 .290 .298 
* 
p < .05 level. 
** 
p < .01 level. 
*** 
.001 level. 
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with 1 degree of freedom on the F distribution, but were composites that 
maximized the variance of a set of variables in relation to the dependent 
variable. A weakness of canonical composites is the "prepackaged" vari­
ance these cOTiposites represent, and the less stringent statistical tests 
that are applied to them because they are used as single variables, not 
the several variables they represent. 
This weakness may have a strength, however, when canonical variates 
are used as control variables. It may be desirable to remove as much 
variation as possible between two variable sets in order to examine the 
relationship of ttie aependeuL vuilaLle to a third variable, or variable 
set. Canonical composites may be particularly useful when referenced to 
a single, ultimate dependent variable that can be used to define the 
variates for the overall analysis. 
The canonical correlation that was most discrepant from its regres­
sion councerparts was ûriciL j-ur cûâracceîrxsuxcs and do%»azn 
consensus (.236 versus .030 and ,044), The organizational output and 
interdependence coefficient also was much greater than the multiple cor­
rélation coefficients (.636 versus .444 and .471), though in neither case 
did significance level differ. 
One canonical correlation was not completely borne out by regres­
sion analysis in terms of statistical significance. The decision-making 
properties were statistically related to domain consensus in canonical 
analysis, but the domain consensus variate was somewhat inconsistent. 
The relationship was accepted, noting the distortion within the canonical 
variate. The regression of the set of individual variables on domain 
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consensus did not verify these results. In future analyses, it may be 
advisable to be particularly cautious in evaluating relationships that 
are premised on internal consistency within one or more variable sets, 
especially when the relationship is only marginally significant in a 
statistical sense. 
The inconsistencies between approaches showed that in terms of sta­
tistical significance, canonical correlation was generally a more con­
servative technique than either regression approach. For example, the 
canonical correlation between output constituency and demain consensus was 
not significant; the composite regression was significant at the .001 
level, and the variable set at the .05 level. In addition, the canonical 
correlation between decisionmaker characteristics and interdependence 
was not significant, while both regression composites were. One observa­
tion is that the canonical correlation technique is more sensitive to 
the number ot variables that comprise a relacionship, and is less likely 
to exaggerate the importance of relationships that are inflated due to 
the sheer number of variables involved. 
The rank ordering of coefficients according to magnitude was consis­
tent within the regressions for each dependent variable. However, differ­
ences in ranking occurred among interdependence predictors, in which 
canonical analysis reversed the decision-making and organizational output 
variable sets. 
In summary, canonical correlations were generally consistent with 
multiple correlations. Infrequent inconsistencies were generally on the 
conservative side, in terms of hypothesis testing. 
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Several advantages appear to accrue with the canonical correlation 
approach. The approach provides greater insight into the relationship 
between sets of variables than multiple regression because the structure 
of the relationship between two sets is displayed in the coefficients 
associated with each set. The nature of the dependent variable can be 
observed, as well as the relative importance of each independent variable. 
As composites, canonical variates effectively package the shared 
variation between sets, but may exaggerate the importance of a finding when 
a single composite represents the shared variation of several variables. 
One strategy may be to only employ sets that have an equal number of indi­
cators and to apply a smaller probability level to hypothesis tests. 
Canonical variates are composites, that are very similar to the com­
pound block variables obtained in regression analysis. They are more 
accurate composites because they do not involve the intermediate step of 
developing composite dependent variables, and the loss of information chis 
may entail. They share the disadvantage of being narrowly defined in 
terms of their relationship to a dependent set, but may have utility in 
decOTiposing hidden partial effects in regression analysis (Coleman, 1976). 
A major disadvantage of canonical correlation is the difficulty of 
analyzing multiple sets of variables when it is desirable to decompose 
the independent effects of each set. This is a general problem of socio­
logical research, and not one strictly limited to canonical analysis. 
The present study resolved the dilemma by combining the dependent vari­
able sets in a traditional manner. Future studies may not find this 
approach convenient nor meaningful. 
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CHAPTER V. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the first four chapters 
and to discuss the theoretical, methodological, and practical implications 
of the study. 
Summary 
Chapter I - Introduction 
Interorganizational networks are an increasingly important aspect 
of modem society. The sociological study of organizations is shifting 
its focus of attention from the individual organization to collections 
of organizations sharing interrelated concerns in a common substantive 
area. The set of organizations considered in this study were responsible 
for related aspects of natural resource management. 
An important property of interorganizational networks is the degree 
to which they are integrated. Two types of integration were identified: 
normative and functional. Normative integration is reflected in domain 
consensus; functional integration in interdependence. Both unify the 
elements of a network: domain consensus through shared definitions of 
role and responsibility; interdependence through exchanges of informa­
tion, resource, and joint activities. 
Demain consensus and interdependence are most directly observed in 
the dyadic relationships between the elements of an interorganizational 
network. The dyad is the nexus of interorganizational interaction. 
Consequently, the dyad was the unit of analysis employed in this study. 
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The similarities and differences of the organizations ccmprising 
organizational dyads were identified as comparative properties. The 
study asked the question: Are regularities in the structure of relation­
ships among the agencies in a network associated with the characteris­
tics of the organizations that compose the network? 
Five research objectives were identified: 
(1) To develop the concept of social integration linking it to 
domain consensus and interdependence in organizational dyads, and to re­
late these concepts to comparative organizational properties. 
(2) To develop specific sets of indicators for each type of inte­
gration and the four sets of comparative organizational properties. 
(3) To determine the relationship between demain consensus and 
interdependence indicators, and the relationship between each type of 
integration and the four sets of comparative organizational property 
variables. 
(4) To examine the overall relationship between composite compara­
tive property variables and composite domain consensus and interdependence 
variables. 
(5) To assess the validity and usefulness of canonical correlation 
as a research procedure. 
Chapter II - Theoretical orientation 
Three major theoretical perspectives that have been employed in the 
study of interorganizational networks were reviewed in this study. These 
were: social integration theory, exchange theory, and open systems 
theory. Social integration theory includes two major types of integration 
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that unify collectivities; normative and functional. Normative integra­
tion is based on common values and its counterpart on the interorganiza-
tional level is shared definitions of organizational roles and responsi­
bilities, or domain consensus. Functional integration is based on ties of 
interdependence, which is reflected in exchanges of information, re­
sources and joint programs in interorganizational dyads. 
Exchange theory has been frequently employed as a means for explain­
ing the dynamics of interorganizational relations. Collectivistic ex­
change processess operate to supplement limited and direct exchanges 
among organizations. Common substantive concerns and public service 
norms underwrite relationships among agencies that would not otherwise 
occur if only limited and direct exchange processes were operative. 
Collectivistic exchanges explain how networks may be integrated even 
though some relationships are only infrequently activated. 
Open systems theory describes relations between open organizational 
systems. Organizations have boundaries that define their regular set 
of activities, or domain. Domain consensus was discussed in terms of 
mutually acknowledged boundaries between organizational systems. 
Comparative properties refer to the similarities and differences of 
interacting organizations. Hypotheses were derived relating the two 
forms of integration first to each other, then to each set of conpara­
ti ve properties. The hypotheses are listed below: 
G.H. 1 The relational property of domain consensus is related 
to the relational property of interdependence. 
G.H. 2 The comparative property of organizational output is 
related to the relational property of domain consensus. 
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G.H. 3 The comparative property of organizational output is 
related to the lalational property of interdependence. 
G.H. 4 The comparative property of output constituency is 
related to the relational property of domain consensus. 
G.H. 5 The comparative property of output constituency is 
related to the relational property of interdependence. 
G.H. 6 The comparative property of decision-making is related 
to the relational property of domain consensus. 
G.H. 7 The comparative property of decisionmaking is related 
to the relational property of interdependence. 
G.H. 8 The comparative property of decision-maker characteristics 
is related to the relational property of demain consensus. 
G.H. 9 The comparative property of decision-maker characteristics 
is related to the relational property of interdependence. 
G.H. 10 The organizational output, output constituency, decision­
making, and decision-maker comparative properties together 
predict the relational property of domain consensus. 
G.H. 11 The organizational output, output constituency, decision­
making, and decision-maker comparative peroperties together 
pfeclici; the relational property of interdependence = 
G.H. 12 Domain consensus is related to interdependence, controlling 
comparative properties. 
Chapter III - Methods 
Networks of county-level organizations involved in various aspects 
of natural resource management comprise the focus of this study. The 
twelve types of agencies in the study included four USDA agencies, six 
state Conservation Commission agencies, and two county government agencies. 
Five contiguous counties in Northeast Iowa defined the study region 
where personal interviews were conducted with 39 administrators. The 
147 interorganizational dyads were derived by combinatorially arranging 
the organizations in each county to represent all relationships. 
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Two major dependent variables were used in the study: domain con­
sensus and interdependence. Domain consensus indicators were derived by 
summing deviations in mutual assessments of involvemient in three hypothet­
ical resource management situations. Interdependence indicators were 
derived by summing the mutual reports of information exchange, resource 
exchange, and joint programming. 
Comparative properties were defined in two ways. Difference 
scores represented the absolute value of differences on variables that 
approximated interval measures. Other dichotomous variables were defined 
in terms of sharing a common service area, client group, or authority 
structure. 
Canonical correlations were used to evaluate the nine empirical 
hypotheses relating each set of comparative property indicators to sets 
of domain consensus and interdependence indicators. Canonical correla­
tions also produced weighted composites for each set of variables that 
were employed in regression analysis to test the last three general 
hypotheses. These specified t'l ' independent effect of the combined 
comparative properties on domai consensus and interdependence, as well 
as the relationship between domain consensus and interdependence, con­
trolling on comparative properties. 
Chapter IV - Findings 
A total of 11 of the 15 empirical hypotheses were accepted. Of 
the 9 canonical correlation hypotheses 5 were accepted, and all regres­
sion hypotheses were accepted. A brief summary of each analysis is 
presented. 
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Canonical correlation The canonical correlations showed that 
demain consensus and interdependence were negatively interrelated. 
Agencies that were more intensively involved developed greater deviations 
in their mutual expectations for activity in hypothetical resource man­
agement situations. 
Domain consensus was negatively related to shared organizational 
output. Organizations that shared similar services had greater discrep­
ancies in their mutual expectations for involvement in the three hypotheti­
cal situations* 
Domain consensus was related to comparative decision-making proper­
ties. Autonomy and formalization differences were related to domain con­
sensus, while organizations that shared a common authority structure 
tended to have higher levels of domain consensus. Domain consensus was 
not related to shared output constituency nor to comparative declslon-
fflâker characteristics. 
Interdependence was positively related to ahared organisational 
output and ohared output constituency. Organisations with similar 
domaine had higher levels of information exchange, resource exchange, 
and joint programming. 
Decisioni9£klng properties were also related to interdependence, 
particularly a variable representing shared decision-snaking eontëxts. 
Sharing a camsitm authoelGy structure was an important dâtestsltmcit d£ 
IntétâêpâOâôflce among the organizations in this ecudy. Fluâlly, lut&l*-
wag not related to comparative decision-maker charactetietics, 
dtftsffeaces in professional activity were an ijnporfcâftE ëëpëcE 
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of the relationship. 
Multiple regression The regression analysis showed that the 
set of comparative properties had independent effects on domain consensus, 
controlling interdependence; and that comparative properties had inde­
pendent effects on interdependence, controlling domain consensus. In 
addition, domain consensus and interdependence were shown to have inde­
pendent effects upon one another, controlling the comparative proper­
ties. It was concluded that domain consensus and interdependence were 
strongly determined by antecedent comparative properties, but that the 
two types of integration had independent effects upon one another, over 
and above the influence of comparative properties. 
The nature of the relationship between domain consensus and inter­
dependence was discussed, concluding that each had concomitant effects 
of the other. An increase in interdependence was likely to be associated 
with a decrease in domain consensus. Likewise, an increase in domain 
consensus was likely to be associated with a decrease in interdependence. 
The next section discusses some of the implications of the study. 
Implications 
Theoretical implications 
Social integration theory The findings of this study were gen­
erally inconsistent with the arguments of social integration theory. In 
contrast to what was expected, similarities were associated with func­
tional integration, or interdependence; and differences were associated 
with normative integration, or domain consensus. 
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Social integration theory has been most frequently discussed in 
reference to societal level processes; apparently integration operates 
in a somewhat different manner on the interorganizational level. Organ­
izations are goal-seeking entities, a property which distinguishes them 
from other units of analysis. The goal-seeking orientation of organiza­
tions is reflected in an emphasis on exchange transactions; relation­
ships occur for a purpose and are not intrinsically valuable in them­
selves. Consequently, common values may have lesser importance in inte­
grating interorganizational networks than exchange relations and inter­
dependent activities. 
The emphasis on functions in interorganizational relationships 
explains the importance of similarity as an antecedent of interdepend­
ence. Organizations may participate in exchanges with similar groups 
because they share an interest in the outcomes the other group will ob­
tain through the exchange relation. Exchanges may be less likely to 
occur between organizations with unrelated purposes because neither has 
a stake in the outcomes the other will obtain from the relationship. 
The notion of involvement in another's outcomes also relates to 
the finding that exchanges were more common between organizations which 
acted as subsystem components of a larger suprasystem. A ccsnmon author­
ity structure provides an important set of common purposes for interde­
pendence, and may even require certain types of interdependence among 
the units. 
One aspect of social integration theory that was supported by the 
findings is the idea that functional integration is a transitional 
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replacement of normative integration. The findings showed that the 
greater the functional integration, the less the normative integration. 
Mutual conceptions of organizational role and responsibility became less 
consistent as interdependence increased. The findings lend support to 
the observation that too much domain consensus can act as a conservative 
force, stabilizing and insulating the separate functions of a set of 
organizations. A high level of domain consensus also may reflect assump­
tions about the separateness of the activities of network participants, 
and their potential for mutual involvement. 
As relationships become more interdependent, they may be character­
ized by increasingly divergent mutual conceptions of organizational 
danain. Heightened interdependence increases the likelihood that differ­
entiated interests and expectations regarding domain will become apparent. 
A high degree of interdependence also tends to lead to a recognition 
among participants of the importance of preserving the existing order in 
the relationship. The importance of protecting investments in a rela­
tionship may outweigh the costs of divergent expectations, and act as 
an incentive to resolve differences or to avoid confronting them. 
In sum, the major implication for social integration theory is 
that interdependence is the major form of integration in interorganiza-
tional networks, and that consensus serves as a conservative, insulating 
function in interorganizational relationships. A certain amount of dis-
sensue may be an important source of innovation in dyadic relationships, 
and a means for activating a network's response to emerging substantive 
problems. 
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Exchange theory Exchange theory provided a context for under­
standing the process of interdependence and its maintenance over time. 
The findings support the importance of exchange as a major integrative 
mechanism in interorganizational networks. 
Exchange relations create ties of commitment and investment in 
interorganizational relationships. Failures to participate or fulfill 
exchange relationships at one point in time may preclude similar rela­
tionships in the future. The principles of generalized exchange help 
explain how transactions that occur only infrequently help integrate 
interorganizational networks. A limited structure of exchange ensures 
that relationships can be activated when needed, and that order exists in 
an ongoing pattern of relationships. 
Generalized exchange processes may also be coupled with public ser­
vice norms that encourage interdependence among agencies offering similar 
services or serving similar client groups. These broader values may ex­
plain the interdependencies that develop and continue to operate despite 
low domain consensus. The costs of nonreciprocal exchange transactions 
may be attributed to common service concerns, or absorbed with the under­
standing that other groups will withstand similar costs in the future. 
In summary, the principles of exchange theory contribute to explanation 
of some of the findings, in particular the relationship between demain 
consensus and interdependence. 
Open systems theory The major implications for open systems 
theory lie in the negative relationship between domain consensus and 
interdependence. Organizations that were less interdependent had 
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clearly defined boundaries between them, and a high level of domain 
consensus, and conversely high interdependence was associated with lower 
levels of domain consensus. Interdependence decreases the clarity and 
fixedness of organizational boundaries; as the number of jointly deter­
mined activities increases, groups generate increasingly differentiated 
and complex expectations for each other's activities, increasing the like­
lihood of dissensus. 
Mutual investments in a relationship are incentives to resolve or 
avoid confronting divergent expectations. In addition, dissensus over 
domain may be reduced by decreasing interdependence, and thus establish­
ing new organizational boundaries. 
Similarity increases the likelihood that mutual goal attainment will 
be advanced by interdependence, as well as the likelihood that divergent 
perceptions of domain will be present. Organizations with dissimilar 
domains are separated from one another and possess well-defined sectors 
of activity, and hence, have high domain consensus. In this study organ­
izations with similar domains were less likely to share congruent defini­
tions of their domains, but were more likely to share activities that 
transcended organizational boundaries. 
Similarity increases the likelihood that groups will encounter com­
mon interests and become interdependent; both similarity and interde­
pendence blur organizational boundaries and expose differentiated organ­
izational interests. Thus both similarity and interdependence are asso­
ciated with lower levels of domain consensus which may be tolerated in 
these relationships because mutual investments in joint outcomes are 
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incentives to do so. 
An important implication underlying all three perspectives is that 
interorganizational relations should not be viewed so much as coopera-
tion-building endeavors, but as continuing processes of conflict dis­
covery and resolution. Organizational systems come together with di­
vergent sets of interests and perspectives. Any lines of concerted 
action that emerge from these relationships occur through the resolution 
of conflict and the definition of common or mutually offsetting inter­
ests in the relationship. 
Methods 
The implications of this study for methods of studying interorganiza­
tional relations are of three basic types: unit of analysis, measurement, 
and statistical analysis. 
Unit of analysis Using the dyad as the I'nit of analysis in 
examining interorganizational relations appears to be a fruitful approach 
to the development of generalizations about the structure of these re­
lationships. The procedures for defining dyads in this study necessarily 
excluded some important interorganizational relationships that did not 
conform to the political boundaries of the county. Defining organiza­
tion sets in terms of county boundaries is a convenient, if not some­
what artificial, means of defining Ihe limits of the interorganizational 
field. Future studies may develop sets of procedures that permit re­
lationships to be systematically defined in a broader interorganizational 
field. This study examined all possible relationships in a narrowly-
defined field; a judgmental approach may be required to select 
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relationships to ^e studied in a broader unit of analysis. 
An advantage of the dyad in the study of interorganizational rela­
tions is that it is the elemental form of these relationships. Inter­
organizational linkages have infrequently been subjected to direct 
scrutiny: Analyses have generally been directed to the overall network 
or the individual organization. In addition, comparative properties have 
been a neglected class of variables in interorganizational research. 
Dyadic analysis is the most direct means of assessing the consequences 
of comparative properties in interorganizational relationships. 
A major disadvantage of dyadic analysis is the multidimensional 
nature of comparative properties which include differences as well as 
the level or total amount of a property in a relationship and the inter­
action between level and differences. These measurement complexities 
are a major disadvantage of dyadic analysis. 
Measurement Dyadic properties in Lliis sLudy wcïe of two types; 
differences reflecting comparative properties of the dyad; and variables 
that represented a canmon property of the dyad as a whole. 
The variables that were most successful in explaining the dependent 
variable sets were those that represent derived dyadic properties such 
as shared services, shared client groups, and shared authority structure. 
Variables involving difference scores generally did not substantially 
contribute to the explanation of the relational variables. 
Future studies may more gainfully employ other aggregate or derived 
dyadic properties of organizational dyads. In addition, this study was 
limited to differences on a particular variable, for example, 
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formalization. Another approach may be to examine the sum of formal­
ization measures, that is, the total amount of formalization in a rela­
tionship. The level of a property in a dyad may be equally important 
as discrepancies. 
The lack of a single dyadic measurement procedure that combines 
level, differences, and level-differences interaction is a major problem 
in sociometric research. The problem may be conceived in terms of a two-
way analysis of variance, where the dependent variable is not based on 
differences, for example, an exchange score. 
Factor D is the difference score for a dyad. Factor S is the sum 
of the dyad element scores. D*S is an interaction term. The variance of 
the exchange score may be attributable to differences on the variable 
(D), to the combined level of the variable in a dyad (S), or to an inter­
action between differences and level (D*S). 
It may not be feasible co combine uirieLcuce, level, and interaction 
terms in a single measure. It may be more meaningful, however, to simul­
taneously examine all three types of dyadic properties as separate vari­
ables. This study focused on differences as the basic aspect of conpara-
tive properties in dyadic relationships: Greater specification of addi­
tional dyadic properties may prove useful in future research on inter-
organizational relationships. 
Statistical analysis Canonical correlation was employed to sum­
marize the relationships between sets of dyadic variables. The technique 
appears to be a useful tool in sociological analysis, but is accompanied 
by certain limitations and interpretative difficulties. 
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A major advantage of canonical analysis is that it is a parsimonious 
method of summarizing the relationship between sets of variables in a 
single statistical decision, or test. Canonical analysis also provides 
information about the structure of relationships between two sets of 
variables that may provide insights into the theoretical meaning of the 
relationship. Item-to-variate correlations show the importance of par­
ticular variables in determining a relationship. 
Canonical correlation also is an efficient means for ascertaining 
the relationship between concepts associated with sets of multiple indica­
tors, particularly with respect to the unidimensionality of the relation­
ship between sets of indicators. In addition, the weights obtained 
through canonical analysis provide a means for developing ccmiposites that 
may be employed to summarize and represent a set of variables in other 
analyses. 
The major disadvantages of canonical correlation are that the method 
statistically maximizes the relationship between two sets of variables 
and weak relationships may be inflated by statistical artifact. Caution 
must be exercised in interpreting and accepting hypotheses based on 
canonical correlations when the results are weak or equivocal, though 
the conservative statistical tests associated with the procedure com­
pensate for these disadvantages. 
One strategy for minimizing the chance occurrence of artifactual 
findings in canonical correlation is to employ cross-validation procedures. 
Cross-validation refers to the process of determining a relationship on 
data collected from two or more samples independently drawn from the same 
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population (Brown, 1970:129). 
Cross-validation might have proceeded in this study by drawing a 
subsample of organizational dyads and developing composite weights and 
canonical correlations. The weighted composites would then be computed 
for the remainder of the sample and the canonical correlations compared. 
The canonical correlations should not differ markedly. If they did, it 
would indicate that relationships may be spuriously inflated. Cross-
validated canonical correlations are then better estimates of the true 
degree of relationship. 
Cross-validation was not employed in this study due to the small 
sample size. A small cross-validation sample may overstate variable 
errors that are randomized in the larger group. Generally, cross-valida 
tion of canonical correlations should be performed on subsamples of at 
least 100. 
Another disadvantage of canonical analysis lies in the lack of sta­
tistical tests for judging the importance of individual variables within 
a set. It must be remembered that the purpose of canonical analysis is 
to provide a summary measure of the relationship between two sets of 
variables and some indication of the structure of that relationship. If 
the researcher desires a test of the importance of individual variables, 
composite dependent variables should be formed and regression analysis 
performed on the individual independent variables, either individually 
or in sets. 
Finally, the results of the regression analysis demonstrated that 
the three ways of treating independent variable sets were not strictly 
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comparable across a fixed set of dependent variables. The regression 
analyses were most similar, while the canonical correlations results were 
greatest in magnitude. The canonical correlations were very similar 
to the individual regression analysis, in terras of statistical signif­
icance. 
The major methodological implication is that the researcher should 
be cognizant of the possibility that her results may vary across composite 
formation approaches. Canonical composites may be used to effectively 
demonstrate the independent effect of a set of variables, but distorted 
dependent variable set weightings in the canonical analysis suggest that 
subsequent regression results should be cautiously interpreted. 
Practical implications The major practical considerations that 
emerge from this study relate to inducing change in interorganizationa1 
networks. Two major themes are: the awareness of sources of potential 
conflicts, and the importance cf authority structures in incerorganina­
tional relations. 
Interorganizational decision-makers are most likely to encounter 
discrepant expectations for their activities emanating from groups to 
which they are most closely linked, particularly in problem areas that 
do not fit any one agency's specific set of responsibilities. Organiza­
tions that are closely linked may be most aware of each other's potential 
for action or involvement, but may not fully appreciate the constraints 
that underlie another's reluctance to undertake certain activities or 
involvements. Greater interaction may increase mutual awareness of 
limitations, but it may also increase performance expectations within 
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those constraints. 
The findings suggest that organizations that are more intensely in­
volved with each other have more divergent expectations regarding each 
other's potential activity in problems that may confront the network. 
Limitations on manpower and other resources may be an important con­
straint on an agency's participation in an interorganizational relation­
ship. Conveying an accurate set of expectations about the level and kind 
of commitments a group may be expected to make to interagency efforts 
may be an important consideration in establishing new relationships and 
activities. 
A second important practical consideration for interorganizational 
relationships is related to the importance of a shared authority struc­
ture in determining interdependence. Interorganizational relationships 
of lasting duration are more likely to occur if superordinate authority 
structures have authnriceâ the resource allocations necessary to support 
the efforts. This is particularly important for local units that operate 
under tight budgetary controls, not only of money, but of time and 
equipment. Local decision-makers may be convinced of the necessity of 
interdependent efforts, but often they aust seek special authorization 
for such activity. In addition, they may find that though superordinate 
levels support interagency activity, such efforts are not equally re­
warded in evaluation processes. The organizational returns for a unit's 
activities with other groups are frequently much less than those for its 
regular activities, even though the interorganizational effort may have 
equal or greater substantive importance. 
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Interorganizational activity is strongly influenced by intraorgan-
izational reward structures. Activities with other units may be viewed 
as supplementary to ongoing responsibilities, and only a certain level 
may be viewed as appropriate for a unit's regular activities. A given 
agency's integration in a network may be limited by its capacity to 
participate in the network, as determined by the nature of its endeavors 
and the level of outside involvement it is permitted to undertake. 
The findings suggest that activities that span two overarching 
authority systems should be accompanied by some form of acknowledgment 
or legitimation by the broader structures. If linkages are to survive 
the tenure of the boundary personnel who first instituted them, the re­
lationships must be recognized and supported by superordinate groups. 
Efforts to implement some form of systematic change in an inter­
organizational network should be informed by prior knowledge of the struc­
ture of interdependence and authority that underlies relations among the 
organizations involved. A network may be more effectively activated to 
respond to a particular problem or situation if the problem is defined 
in terms of existing interdependencies and responsibilities, which ex­
tend ongoing relationships to the new activity. 
To induce new relationships or patterns of interaction among organ­
izations, authority structures are centrally important for legitimizing 
and supporting the new activities. Incentives to participate in the 
new pattern of interaction must accure from the change to make the struc­
ture of relationships self-sustaining. Further research may systemati­
cally examine the value of these assertions about the dynamics of inter­
organizational networks. 
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Table A.l. Means, standard deviations, and ranges for individual 
dependent and independent variables 
S tandard 
Variables Mean deviation Range 
Domain consensus 
Danain^ 6,027 1.286 1-8 
Domain, 5.959 1.253 2-8 
Domain^ 5.925 1.198 2-8 
Interdependence 
Joint programs ,911 1.400 0-6 
Resource exchange 6.616 18.890 0 - 100 
Information exchange 15.500 25.148 0 - 100 
Organizational output 
Regulatory activity .137 .345 0-1 
Cost-sharing assistance .041 .199 0-1 
Technical assistance .238 .454 0-1 
Planning assistance .260 .440 0-1 
Information assistance .390 .489 0-1 
Financial assistance .021 .142 0-1 
Management-development .130 .345 0-1 
Output constifpncy 
Farmers .226 .420 0-1 
Private Industry .178 .384 0-1 
Recreational users .137 .345 0-1 
Nonfarm landowners .164 ,372 0-1 
Park-users .062 .241 0-1 
Homeowners .102 .305 0-1 
Local agencies .295 .457 0-1 
Cecisien-making properties 
Autonomy 12.678 4.859 1-27 
Formalization 3.101 1.569 0-8 
Decision context .274 .448 0-1 
Decision-maker characteristics 
Tenure 5.562 5.243 0-27 
Professional activity 1.267 1.687 0-8 
Education 1.206 1.069 0-4 
Age 11.226 8.819 0 - 36 
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Table A.2, Correlations between individual domain consensus and 
interdependence variables and individual independent 
variables 
Joint 
Variable pro- Resource Infor-
grams exchange xnation 
Domain consensus 
Domain^ 
Domaing 
Domain^ 
Interdependence 
Joint programs 
Resource exchange 
Information exchange 
Organizational output 
Regulatory activity 
Cost-sharing assistance 
Technical assistance 
Planning assistance 
Information assistance 
Financial assistance 
Management-development 
Output constituency 
Farmers 
Private industry 
Recreational users 
Nonfarm landowners 
Park-users 
Homeowners 
Local agencies 
Decision-making properties 
Autonomy .22 -.08 .09 .01 .14 .00 
Formalization .07 -.10 .00 .12 -.04 -.02 
Decision context ,17 .13 -.03 .50 .32 .47 
îcision-maker characteristics 
Tenure -.03 -.05 -.11 .05 .09 -.02 
Professional activity -.09 -.06 .02 -.23 -.15 -.21 
Education .11 -.16 .04 .05 .02 -.01 
Age ".01 -.10 .04 .12 .03 ,10 
"Correlations of absolute val"e .16 or greater are significant at 
the .05 level. 
.00 .18 .19 .07 -.04 -.01 
.18 1.00 .26 .00 -.18 .05 
.19 .26 1.00 -.14 -.35 -.16 
.07 .00 -.14 1.00 .40 .49 
.04 -.18 -.35 .40 1.00 .52 
.01 .05 -.16 .49 .52 1.00 
.01 -.03 -.11 .00 .02 .03 
.09 -.10 -.28 .14 .45 .14 
.14 .08 .00 .06 -.14 -.20 
.01 -.03 -.08 .28 .19 .01 
.11 ,08 .00 .09 .07 -.15 
.03 -.15 -.19 .18 .41 .12 
.15 -.08 -.07 .15 .32 .07 
.05 -.10 -.14 .24 .26 .04 
.00 .03 -.03 .12 -.08 -.13 
.10 .11 .06 .15 .17 -.01 
.08 .06 .01 .21 -.12 -.13 
.22 .03 .06 .00 -.04 .08 
.03 .03 .00 .04 -.10 -.15 
.03 -.05 -.11 .30 .23 .03 
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Table A.3. Regression of domain consensus and interdependence on 
comparative property composites (standardized beta 
coefficients) 
Variable Standardized beta 
Domain consensus Interdependence 
Organizational output 
Output constituency 
Organizational decision-making 
Decision-maker characteristics 
-.267 
*** 
.172 
-.234 
** 
.217 
** 
(I) .221 
(II) .102 
i 
.469 
*** 
.081 .124 
R .429 .689 
.2 iM4 .4/2 
*** *** 
F-value 4.745 25.008 
p X .05. 
** p < .01. 
p ( .001. 
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Table A.4. Regression of domain consensus and interdependence on 
comparative property composites and alternate integra­
tion composite (standardized beta coefficients) 
Variable Standardized beta 
Domain consensus Interdependence 
Organizational output 
Output constituency 
Organizational decisionmaking 
.190 
-.178 
.259 
** 
.136 
(I) .199 
(II) .111 
.475 
** 
*** 
Decision-maker characteristics .094 .129 
Domain consensus .160 
Interdependence -.202 
R 
F-value 
,459 
.210 
7.463* 
.703 
.495 
22.681' 
*** 
* 
p .05. 
** 
p .01. 
*** 
p .005. 
